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Articles
From Commons to Claims: Property
Rights in the California Gold Rush
Andrea G. McDowell
I. INTRODUCTION
Scholars have long been interested in the emergence of a system of
property rights in the California gold mines in 1848 to 1850, when
California experienced a complete disintegration of its government,
Willard Hurst Legal History Research Fellow, University of Wisconsin Law School. I
would like to thank Morris Cohen for first suggesting the research topic of law in the
California gold rush. John Reid helped me narrow this down to property law in the gold mines
and then generously gave me full access to the voluminous quotations, references, and ideas
that he had collected for a book on the subject some years ago. This, and the insights he gave
me in conversation, have smoothed the way immensely. A number of friends and colleagues
have read the manuscript in various stages and discussed problems with me, particularly Anne
Alstott, Robert Ellickson, Bill Ewald, Robert Gordon, Sally Gordon, Jane Larson, Robin
McDowell, Art McEvoy, Donald Pisani, and Jim Whitman. I am also grateful to the Beinecke
Library at Yale University for granting me the Archibald Hanna, Jr. Fellowship in American
history, which enabled me to spend a month using their collection; and to the staff of the
Huntington Library in San Marino and the Bancroft Library in Berkeley, who were all
extremely helpful.
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law, and social order.1 At the end of the Mexican War in 1848, the
region was left without a legislature, without bureaucracy, without a
law code except in theory, and without police or jails. Its non-native
population numbered about 15,000. By the end of the next year,
however, 100,000 gold-seekers-all men, all hoping to strike it rich,
and almost none having a long-term interest in California-had
poured into the mining region from every corner of the globe.2
Though many had traveled in companies formed in their hometowns,
these split up upon reaching the mines; and although family, friends,
and immigrants from the same state frequently dug near one an-
other, most of the miners in any given camp were strangers to each
other.
This was as close to a state of nature as Americans would ever
come. Not only were there no institutions to enforce the laws, there
were no laws.3 Certainly there were no laws governing property
rights in mineral lands;4 and because this was America's first gold
1. See RODMAN W. PAUL, CALIFORNIA GOLD: THE BEGINNING OF MINING IN THE FAR
WEST 116 (Univ. of Nebraska Press 1965) (1947). The first flush period, when gold could be
picked up with relatively little labor, lasted until 1851. From 1851 onwards it took capital and
labor to extract the gold: "The man who lives upon his labor from day to day, must hereafter
be employed by the man who has in his possession accumulated labor, or money, the repre-
sentative of labor." The Cause of the Depression in Trade- The Cure, ALTA CALIFORNIA
(San Francisco), Feb. 14, 1851, at 2.
2. See Doris Marion Wright, The Making of Cosmopolitan California: An Analysis of
Immigration, 1848-1870 (pt. 1), 19 CAL. HIST. Soc'Y Q. 323, 323 (1940). See also THOMAS
BUTLER KING, REPORT OF HON. T. BUTLER KING, ON CALIFORNIA, CONG. Doc. SER. 577,
H. EXEC. Doc. NO. 59, 31st Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (Mar. 26, 1850). King estimated a population of
ten to fifteen thousand at the end of the Mexican War, exclusive of Indians, and immigration
into California of eighty thousand Americans and twenty thousand foreigners in 1849. It was
impossible to estimate the number of Indians, King wrote. "In fact, the whole race seems to be
rapidly disappearing." Id.
3. When California became an American territory, Mexican civil law remained in force but
no copies of the laws were available. Moreover, the northern part of California was not
inhabited by Mexicans and could reasonably be described as without local law. General Persi-
for F. Smith wrote on April 19, 1849 that he could not even find a copy of the laws of the
United States in California. See CALIFORNIA AND NEW MEXICO, CONG. DOc. SER. 573, S.
EXEC. DOc. No. 18, H. EXEC. DOc. NO. 17,31st Cong., 1st Sess. 698 (1850).
4. The United States acquired California under the terms of the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo, signed on Feb. 2, 1848, shortly after gold was discovered. Article IV, section 3 of the
U.S. Constitution provides that Congress shall make all rules and regulations concerning U.S.
territories. However, Congress did not create a territorial government for California, because
of fears that either sanctioning or forbidding slavery in the new territory would upset the
balance between slave and free states. The military governors of California, General Kearney
and Colonel (later General) R.B. Mason, acted as de facto civil governors; but their successor,
General Riley, was appointed after the end of the war, and therefore could not serve as civil
governor. California at this time was thus without a government and without laws. When the
citizens of Sonoma met to select delegates to the Territorial Convention on February 5, 1849,
they declared that "by treaty, Upper California has been ceded to the United States of Amer-
ica, thus depriving the people of the benefit of the laws of Mexico and Congress not having
provided them with any other government, they are without laws or officers." Meeting at
Sonoma, ALTA CALIFORNIA (San Francisco), Mar. 1, 1849, at 1. General Riley assumed the
position of civil governor on his own authority on June 3, 1849. See CALIFORNIA AND NEW
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rush, the Americans had no experience or customs to fall back on.
American miners created, codified, and enforced a new system of
property rights based on mining claims-not fee-simple-with
extraordinarily tight restrictions on claimholders' rights. The genesis
of this regime, the nature of the rights it created, and the principles
and expectations on which it was based are the subject of this article.
Mining claims are an ancient institution based on the civil-law rule
that the sovereign holds title to all mineral deposits. Miners did not
own the land they worked, nor did landowners always hold mining
rights in their own property; instead, the first miner on the site
acquired the usufruct through discovery, notice, and continuous use.
This system was known to Spanish-speaking miners, Cornish and
German miners, and lead miners from Missouri, Wisconsin, and
Illinois, among others who came to California.'
The Californians undoubtedly borrowed from earlier mining rules
and customs, but their choice of a claim system was a real choice.
England and America had relatively little experience in gold and
silver mining (as opposed to the mining of baser metals),6 and the
laws of Mexico concerned gold mining in veins or loads almost
exclusively-the rules of placer mining were left to the discretion of
the miners themselves.7 The early mining traditions were also varied
and adaptable; they left room to maneuver and opportunity for the
American miners to choose between options and to inject their own
values. Moreover, the miners in California were free from all author-
ity and could have done as they liked. In their own recent past, the
U.S. government had decided to sell the mineral lands of what is now
MEXICO, supra note 3, at 752. The people of California elected delegates to draft a Consti-
tution and adopted their draft by general vote on November 13, 1849. At no time was there
any detailed mining code in America, nor was there any federal policy or statute. Mexican
mining law was abolished by the American military governor, R.B. Mason, on February 12,
1848. See CALIFORNIA AND NEW MEXICO, supra note 3, at 452-53.
5. The California miners drew on the experience of miners in several parts of the world
rather than relying on any one system. See PAUL, supra note 1, at 212-13. Some of the issues
raised by mineral deposits on the public lands had been faced before in milder versions. See,
e.g., JAMES E. WRIGHT, THE GALENA LEAD DISTRICT: FEDERAL POLICY AND PRACTICE
1824-1847, at 19 (1966) (noting that Martin Thomas, Superintendent of the U.S. Lead Mines,
opposed the sale of lead mining claims in a letter to the Secretary of War in 1826 for the same
reason that Thomas Hart Benton would oppose the sale of gold mining claims: because
capitalists would become the primary land owners). See infra note 168 and accompanying text.
6. See J. ROSS BROWNE, REPORT ON THE MINERAL RESOURCES OF THE STATES AND
TERRITORIES WEST OF THE ROCKY MOUNTAINS, CONG. DOC. SER. 1289, H. EXEC. DOC. NO.
202, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 226 (1867) (stating that "mining for gold and silver is a business new
in Anglo-Saxon life and not provided for in our laws"). On the history of gold mining in
America, see CHARLES HOWARD SHINN, MINING CAMPS: A STUDY IN AMERICAN FRONTIER
GOVERNMENT 37-46 (Rodman Wilson Paul ed., photo. reprint 1970) (1885).
7. See BROWNE, supra note 6, at 257-64 (providing extracts from the original Spanish
ordinance of 1793). The section concerning placer mining (ch. 8, § 10) left the regulation of
these mines to territorial deputations of miners.
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the mid-West after an unsuccessful attempt at leasing, and the
miners could have drawn on this model of ownership for their
mining codes.8 In fact, newspaper editors, military officers, and U.S.
presidents would have preferred a regime that created greater secur-
ity of title; they suggested that the land in the gold region should be
sold or leased, eliminating the requirements of notice and continuous
use. The miners not only protested vociferously against all such pro-
posals, but also placed tighter restrictions on claimholders than did
any earlier system.
Indeed, it is not obvious that miners had to have any rights in the
ground they worked. They managed without private property rights
in land during 1848, the first year of the gold rush, when the mining
region remained a commons. This was not because, to paraphrase
Locke, there was still enough and as good mineral land left. Rather,
the first miners, mostly soldiers and sailors, grabbed what they could
and moved on without staying anywhere long enough to form a com-
munity that could devise and enforce property rights.
In 1849, when property rights in mineral lands became the rule, the
miners did not fight each other to a standstill, as Hobbes might have
proposed; they did not apply Locke's theory that one acquires a per-
manent interest in land by mixing one's labor with it; nor did they try
to devise a property regime that would maximize wealth production. 9
Instead, I suggest, the miners developed and codified rules that are
striking for the restrictions they placed on claimholders' rights.
These restrictions-strict limits on claim size, notice and work re-
quirements, and, in many cases, prohibitions against holding more
than one claim at a time-benefited not only the current claim-
holders, but also miners who hoped to get a claim.
The miners' objections to fee-simple anticipated Henry George's
famous indictment of property in land as unnatural and unjust.
Indeed, George's Progress and Poverty was largely informed and
inspired by the California experience, though more by that of the
settlers than that of the miners. He argued that Locke's theory of
property applies only to things that the owner has produced person-
ally or acquired from the producer. Land cannot be owned, he said,
8. Various statutes in 1846 and 1847 opened for sale lands containing "copper, lead, or
other valuable ores." See, e.g., Act of Mar. 1, 1847, ch. 32, 9 Stat. 146 (1847). See also CURTIS
H. LINDLEY, A TREATISE ON THE AMERICAN LAW RELATING TO MINES AND MINERAL
LANDS § 35 (3d ed. 1914).
9. As will be discussed at greater length below, John Umbeck has theorized that the
property regime was an equilibrium based on violence. See JOHN UMBECK, A THEORY OF
PROPERTY RIGHTS: WITH APPLICATION TO THE CALIFORNIA GOLD RUSH (1981). In con-
trast, Richard 0. Zerbe and C. Leigh Anderson submit that efficiency determined the standard
claim size. Richard 0. Zerbe, Jr. & C. Leigh Anderson, Culture and Fairness in the Develo-
ment of Institutions in the California Gold Fields, 61 J. ECON. HIST. 114 (2001).
[Vol. 14: 1
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because it is not the product of labor; the property rights in land that
we know today were originally created by force or by declaration,
neither of which can be defended under natural law. Moreover,
George maintained, private property in land is unjust because those
who control the land effectively control the others who are landless;
fee-simple in land will always generate an aristocratic, landholding
class and a class of laborers who are effectively their slaves." George
blamed the poverty and unemployment in San Francisco on mono-
polists who held most of the surrounding land at speculative prices,
and he pointed to the diggings of 1849 and 1850 as rare examples of
communities that did not recognize fee-simple and thus escaped the
otherwise ubiquitous monopoly and exploitation. According to
George,
Labor was acknowledged as the creator of wealth, was given a
free field, and secured in its reward.... No one was allowed to
play the dog in the manger with the bounty of the Creator. The
essential idea of the mining regulations was to prevent
forestalling and monopoly."
George believed that because the camps mushroomed almost over-
night and the question of property rights was approached de novo,
the miners were able to preserve the mineral region as common
property.
I submit that George's account of property law in the mines was
not merely an ex post facto explanation of the miners' motives and
results. The first mining claims probably emerged as a practical
solution to the pressure of numbers at rich diggings, but very soon
the custom that evolved in the first months of 1849 was codified, with
variations, in various camps. These mining codes maintained the
stringent restrictions on claimholders' rights that were first imposed
by custom. Over time, the miners and their representatives in Con-
gress came to associate title in land with monopoly, and restricted
10. See HENRY GEORGE, PROGRESS AND POVERTY: AN INQUIRY INTO THE CAUSE OF
INDUSTRIAL DEPRESSIONS, AND OF INCREASE OF WANT WITH INCREASE OF WEALTH (New
York, Robert Schalkenbach Foundation 1942) (1879). George's powerful exposition of wide-
spread poverty amidst spectacular material progress won him a wide readership among the
general public and inspired many future reformers. His proposed solution, a single-tax on land
value that would capture rent for the community, has drawn steady fire from economists. See.
e.g., CRITICS OF HENRY GEORGE: A CENTENARY APPRAISAL OF THEIR STRICTURES ON
PROGRESS AND POVERTY (Robert V. Andelson ed., 1979). George's theories have recently
been the subject of renewed interest, however. See, e.g., Stewart .E. Sterk, Nollan, Henry
George, and Exactions, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1731 (1988); Timothy Beatley & Richard Collins,
Smart Growth and Beyond Transitioning to a Sustainable Society, 19 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 287,
313.
11. GEORGE, supra note 10, at 386.
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property rights with the interests of labor, and they consistently
resisted attempts to introduce fee-simple into the mines.
Even claimholders regarded themselves as laborers rather than as
property holders. Indeed, it was they who passed the rules restricting
property rights in favor of those waiting to jump a claim. I suggest
that claimholders voluntarily restricted their own rights because they
knew that they would soon exhaust their present claims and would
need to stake, jump, or buy others. If it was possible to hold title to
mineral lands, they might find that a few rich individuals had bought
up most of the diggings and had shut out others. The claimholders
codified a system that balanced the interests of those who held prop-
erty (themselves) and those who were propertyless, because they
could imagine that they, too, would soon be looking for a new claim.
In other words, the miners drafted their codes from behind a
Rawlsian "veil of ignorance" about their own future positions as
property holders. John Rawls posits a hypothetical situation in which
free and equal persons agree upon the basic structure of a new
society without knowing where they will stand in that society, or
what talents, ambitions, or social position they will hold.12 Fair terms
of social cooperation are those to which its members would agree if
they were in this original position. Rawls says that this original
position is non-historical, "since we do not suppose that the agree-
ment has ever, or indeed actually could ever be entered into."13 The
mining codes, however, were just such agreements made by free and
equal persons, although they covered only a few elements of the
basic structure of society-namely, property and criminal law. The
miners' inability to predict their success during the coming season
explains their decision to impose work requirements, notice require-
ments, and above all, prohibitions on accumulation of claims-which
operated in many, perhaps most, of the diggings. Each of these
characteristics made more claims available to those who did not yet
have one.
The terms of the mining custom and codes also made effective and
speedy self-government possible. In light of Henry Hansmann's
study of worker-owned industries," I will suggest that a large-scale,
fully participatory democracy, like that of the diggings, was possible
because the miners had very similar interests in the diggings. Restric-
tions that required one claim per person, claims of equal size, and
12. JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 14-18 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001)
[hereinafter RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS]; RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 24-25 (1993).
13. RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 12, at 16-17. Rawls adds that even if such an
agreement could be entered into, "that would make no difference [to his theory]." Id
14. Henry Hansmann, When Does Worker Ownership Work, 99 YALE L.J. 1749 (1990).
[Vol. 14: 1
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work requirements that tended to keep claim-owners on their claims
helped to ensure the homogeneity without which the system of self-
government would have collapsed.
Previous studies of property law in the mines have overlooked the
crucial point that every claimholder expected soon to become an
outsider. The earlier interpretations of the mining codes, and espe-
cially of their restrictions on property rights, are therefore quite dif-
ferent from mine." The first modern analysis, by Charles Umbeck,
was in the law-and-economics tradition. 6 Umbeck suggested that
violence or the threat of violence determined claim sizes and other
provisions of the code; miners maximized their incomes by balancing
factors such as time spent digging, time spent fighting to defend their
claims or to acquire more land, and the richness of the diggings. Um-
beck further suggested that restrictions such as work requirements
and accumulation restraints made it costly for miners to leave the
diggings, and thus kept miners on their claims and available to join in
the enforcement of the original contract."
Umbeck's premise has recently been refuted by Richard Zerbe
and Leigh Anderson, who note that there was little or no violence in
the gold-mining camps of 1848 to 1850.18 Zerbe and Anderson
theorize that American cultural norms facilitated the development of
legal institutions in the gold mines. 9 On that view, these norms
served as focal points, which simplified the task of agreeing upon and
enforcing a new property regime. One set of norms included the
practice of holding meetings and respecting majority rule, which en-
abled American miners to organize themselves and to enact rules
effectively. Other norms, which Zerbe and Anderson call "Lockean
fairness" and "producerism," shaped the content of the codes. I will
argue below that in the peculiar conditions of the California gold
mines, there emerged new norms of egalitarianism and anti-
capitalism that made sense in that context but did not conform to
15. The first studies of property regimes in the gold mines were written be Charles Howard
Shinn. CHARLES HOWARD SHINN, LAND LAWS OF MINING DISTRICTS (Johns Hopkins Univ.
Stud. in Hist. and Poli. Sci., 2d ser., No. XII, 1884) and SHINN, supra note 6. Shinn had been a
school teacher in a mining camp in 1878 and had observed the local mining code in action and
had spoken with the many old pioneers. Unfortunately, he does not document his statements.
He does, however, make the useful point that Americans of every class were accustomed to
holding meetings, electing officials, voting, and abiding by majority rule, a point that Zerbe
and Anderson develop in their analysis.
16. UMBECK, supra note 9.
17. See id at 99-132.
18. See Zerbe & Anderson, supra note 9.
19. Zerbe and Anderson use Reid's theory of behaviorism based on law as their point of
departure. See id. at 125. See also JOHN PHILLIP REID, LAW FOR THE ELEPHANT: PROPERTY
AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR ON THE OVERLAND TRAIL (1980).
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standard American views on property.0 I will also present evidence
that the desire to maximize overall productivity played a minimal
role in determining claim sizes.
Both Umbeck's work, on the one hand, and that of Zerbe and
Anderson, on the other, offer the usual, broad outline of what
happened in the mines-namely, that when there were enough
miners, they held a meeting and passed rules. The evidence fully sus-
tains this account. However, when one tries to describe in detail how
and when and by whom the rules were enacted, a number of further
questions arise. What was the state of affairs in a camp before the
mining code was enacted? As I argue below, miners who were
beyond the jurisdiction of a mining district abided by the customary
law of the diggings. Could the camps have managed without a code,
by using the customary law instead? The latter was very sketchy, but
then so were many of the early codes; it was unwritten, but this was
also true of many early codes. What did the written rules contribute?
Codes were usually passed only after enough miners had arrived at a
diggings to raise the possibility of conflicts of interest. By that time,
many had already staked out claims and invested labor. A change in
the maximum claim size or limits on accumulation could be dis-
ruptive; and why, exactly, should those with claims attend to the
demands of the outsiders? Once the new rules were introduced, how
were claims distributed? Was passing rules a smooth process, or did
some of the early claimholders resist? If they resisted, how did they
do it and did they ever succeed? Did all miners comply with the rules
or did some try to subvert them? The answers to these lesser ques-
tions do not merely help to answer the big question of how and why
the law codes were passed; they are the answer to the big question.
Any account of the development of property law in the mines that is
not based on the actual sequence of events in the diggings is at best a
20. By egalitarianism, I mean a principle of distributive justice by which everyone receives
an equal share of a scarce resource. In this case, the resource is ground, the value of which is an
opportunity of finding gold; the egalitarianism in the gold mines thus boiled down to equal
opportunity. The various different theories which could be designated "egalitarian" are
reviewed in Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew L. Spitzer, Entitlements, Rights. and Fairness: An
Experimental Examination of Subjects' Concepts of Distributive Justice, 14 J. LEGAL STUD.
259,263-64 (1985).
21. Zerbe and Anderson suggest that there was an optimal size for claims, a size that could
be worked most productively. Zerbe & Anderson, supra note 9, at 130. A third modern
discussion of property rights in the California gold rush is Andrew Morriss, Miners, Vigilantes
& Cattlemen: Overcoming Free Rider Problems in the Private Provision of Law, 33 LAND &
WATER L. REV. 581 (1998). Morriss describes the basic features of property rights and lynch
law in the mines as examples of privately produced law as opposed to law provided by the
state: he does not focus on the transition from anarchy to property or the miners' reasons for
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lucky guess. The first sections below therefore address the circum-
stances surrounding the passage of the first codes.
This Article begins with a discussion of the gold-mining region in
1848, before the appearance of mining claims-that is, when the dig-
gings were treated as a commons. It then turns to the introduction of
private property rights in mineral land-and in particular, to the
circumstances in which claims first appeared and the nature of the
rights represented by a mining claim. I note that the customary law
gave the miners very limited rights in their claims, and that the claim-
holders themselves later voted for mining codes that included these
same restrictions on their rights. In the culture of the diggings, I
argue, fee-simple in mining claims came to be associated with
capitalism and the exploitation of labor, and, for that reason, was
perceived as ideologically suspect and as contrary to the current
claimholders' long-term interests. Finally, I suggest that the miners
drew up their rules and regulations from behind a veil of ignorance
about their future success or failure in the mines, and that under
these circumstances, they chose to maintain a regime in which
property would not become concentrated in the hands of the few-a
regime that in some respects resembles Rawls's property-owning
democracy.
II. CALIFORNIA IN 1848
In 1848, while Europe was in the throes of revolutions against
kings, princes, and aristocrats, the social hierarchy of California
simply dissolved. The gold was there for the taking. Labor and labor
alone could generate the new wealth; education, rank, and connec-
tions were suddenly irrelevant. Almost all employees rushed off to
the mines, as did almost all employers. The governor himself lost his
servants and had to make his own bed and cook his own breakfast.
In the mines, all of society, high and low, worked shoulder to
shoulder with picks and pans. As one of the earliest miners observed,
"In a short time after gold digging became a remunerative calling,
society was reduced to a level."22 Capital had become nothing and
labor was everything. Egalitarians were amazed and exhilarated by
the revolution, by which "labour ha[d] obtained the upper hand of
capital, or rather, ha[d] become capital itself."23
22. James H. Carson, Life in California, reprinted in DORIS SHAW CASTRO, JAMES H.
CARSON'S CALIFORNIA, 1847-1853, at 74, 87 (1997).
23. WILLIAM THURSTON, ESQ. GUIDE TO THE GOLD REGIONS OF UPPER CALIFORNIA 35
(1849) (quoting "a correspondent in New York"). See also The Gold Mine. CALIFORNIAN
(San Francisco), Aug. 14, 1848, at 2 ("The laboring class have now become the capitalists of
the country."). This edition of the Californian was intended for circulation back in the States.
Both of these remarks were intended to encourage immigration and raised the expectations of
2002]
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Meanwhile, those who believed that concentrations of capital and
a supply of wage-labor were necessary for progress-that is, for
effective gold mining, road building, and the growth of industry-
agreed that nothing of the kind could take place until the placers
were exhausted. These traditionalists guessed correctly that they had
to be patient for a few years, but that their time would come. As one
observer noted in 1849, "When this gold mania ceases to rage, indivi-
duals will abandon the mines; and then there will be a good oppor-
tunity for companies with heavy capital to step in, and it is then that
the country will enter on a career of real progress."24 Even Thomas
Hart Benton, who opposed the sale of mineral lands on the ground
that it would inevitably result in monopoly, thought that the sooner
the gold rush was over, the better it would be for California. "Then
the sober industry will begin which enriches and ennobles a
nation."25 This prediction proved to be correct. The leveling effect of
the gold mines that was so striking in 1848 continued to a lesser
degree in 1849 and even 1850. By 1851, the placers were yielding
only a fraction of their former riches, and those who had only labor
to contribute were again obliged to work for capital.26
Labor's zenith occurred in 1848, the year in which an individual
could collect one or two ounces a day with a pick and pan. Many
made their fortunes. Because anyone could earn this kind of money
in the mines, workers in every other occupation commanded the
same exorbitant wages, or broke their contracts and left for the
diggings. It became impossible to employ a white man. The pre-
those who set out for the mines. See DAVID GOODMAN, GOLD SEEKING: VICTORIA AND
CALIFORNIA IN THE 1850s, at 46-63 (1994) (comparing American and Australian reactions to
the discovery of gold in their respective countries). The Australians associated the leveling of
the class hierarchy as a collapse of order, whereas the Americans viewed the gold rush through
the lens of egalitarian republicanism, celebrating the equality of miners while deploring the
corrupting effects of wealth.
24. "F.P.W." [Felix Paul Wierzbicki], The California Gold Region, ALTA CALIFORNIA
(San Francisco) (Steamer Edition), Aug. 31, 1849, at 3. These words appear again in FELIX
PAUL WIERZBICKI, CALIFORNIA AS IT IS AND AS IT MAY BE 34 (George D. Lyman ed.,
Grabhorn Press 1933) (1849). Henry Carter wrote in the summer of 1849 that when wages
dropped to two dollars per day, then "mining will be done here as in other parts of the world,
and capital and science employed to advantage, and all bars and diggings now neglected will be
worked at a profit." Henry Carter, Journal, April 1849-February 1850, at 24 (unpublished
typescript copy, Bancroft Library, Univ. of California, Berkeley, catalogued at Banc MSS
92/903 C) (entry for July 1849).
25. CONG. GLOBE, 30th Cong., 2d Sess. 257, col. 3 (1849). Benton delivered his speech in
the Senate on January 15, 1849.
26. PAUL, supra note 1, at 116-17.
27. A number of Californians made fortunes by employing large numbers of Indians, who
did not yet know the value that the immigrants set on gold. The most spectacular earnings
reported for 1848 represented the work of up to 100 Indians. In 1849, Indians no longer
worked for hire but either dug for themselves or withdrew from the area.
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eminence of labor in 1848 served as an ideal that the miners of later
years always kept in mind.
In 1848, there were also no property rights in land of any sort,
whether by discovery or signaling, and hence land could not be
acquired by purchase or other transfer. "Claims," in the sense of
exclusive rights to exploit certain parcels of gold-bearing ground
under certain conditions, were unknown in many districts through
the whole of this year. Instead, the discoverer of a rich spot simply
had to grin and bear it when other miners flocked in and helped
themselves; and yet there appears to have been no fighting over such
treasure troves. The absence of property rights in land in 1848 is
interesting both in itself, as an unusual phenomenon, and as a
reminder that property rights do not appear spontaneously-they
must be created.
Before the introduction of claims, the mining region was treated as
a commons from which anyone could gather gold, so long as he did
not interfere physically with other miners. The Californian of May 3,
1848, reported that many assumed there would eventually be some
kind of preemption right, "but as yet every person takes the right to
gather all they can, without regard to claims."' In the richest dig-
gings, this meant that the miners dug almost shoulder to shoulder. "I
began to work at mining when there was not even a custom," report-
ed one old miner to Charles Howard Shinn, "so that a man hardly
objected to your digging close beside him so long as you gave him
room to swing a pick."'29
The ramifications of this lack of property rights in land are illus-
trated by Edward Gould Buffum's experience in the neighborhood
of Weaver's Creek (also called Weberville, in El Dorado County).3"
As late as January or February 1849, there was still no such thing as
a claim at Weaver's Creek, and hence no discoverer's right to a
double share.3' When a miner found gold in a new location, others
swarmed in, dug it out, and departed in a matter of days. Buffum,
who was a particularly successful miner, hoped to find a place of his
own, away from the crowds, where he could work in peace; and he
did indeed find an isolated little ravine, about thirty feet long, where
he gathered $190 on his first day. The next day, unfortunately, he
was followed:
28. Gold Mfines of the Sacramento, CALIFORNIAN (San Francisco), May 3, 1848, at 2.
29. SHINN, supra note 6, at 166. This statement was presumably made from memory in the
early 1880s, but the informant, C.T. Blake, was a Yale graduate.
30. For the location and a brief description of each mining camp, see ERWIN G. GUDDE,
CALIFORNIA GOLD CAMPS (Elizabeth K. Gudde ed., 1975).
31. A miner who discovered new diggings was entitled to two claims in all later mining
codes. See infra Part IV.D.
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I found myself suddenly surrounded by twenty good stout
fellows, all equipped with their implements of labour. I could
say or do nothing. Pre-emption rights are things unknown here,
and the result of the matter was, that in three days the little
ravine, which I had so fondly hoped would be my own property,
was turned completely upside down. About ten thousand dollars
worth of gold dust was extracted from it, from which I realized a
little over a thousand.32
Buffum was clearly annoyed by the invasion of "his ravine," not just
because it cost him money, but also because he felt there ought to be
a pre-emption right. Since no such right was recognized in the mines
at the time, the "twenty good stout fellows," who are made to sound
like bullies, were acting in accordance with the custom of the neigh-
borhood. They did not push Buffum out, and they did not take away
his gold; indeed, they left him a generous amount of room to work,
to judge by his earnings, which were twice as much as those of the
average interloper.
A possible explanation for the absence of claims in 1848 is that the
hit-and-run nature of mining was incompatible with settled commu-
nities of the sort that could enact and enforce property law. The
miners swarmed to a new diggings, took the most accessible gold,
and moved on. As much as a talented prospector like Buffum might
have preferred to settle down and work out his "own" patch of
ground, there was no hope of keeping it his own until a large enough
number of like-minded miners stayed long enough to form an assem-
bly and vote for a system that would protect his interests-or, rather,
that would create and then defend a property right in the ground.
Respect for private property depends on a shared understanding of
what can be property and what has in fact been converted to private
property. While the mining region was treated as a commons, Buf-
fum would have been a maverick if he had tried to enforce his claim
to the ravine; it was the creation of his property that was an act of
theft from the community. His case supports John Stuart Mill's con-
tention (coincidentally also published in 1848) that property exists
only by the consent of society.33 A year later, when custom or com-
mon law had evolved in the various regions of the mines, setting
claim sizes at ten feet or fifteen feet and allotting the discoverer an
extra claim, the newcomers would have respected these rights or
32. EDWARD GOULD BUFFUM, SIX MONTHS IN THE GOLD MINES 91 (1850).
33. JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, book II, ch. 1, §1 (1848).
The idea that private property is a creation of positive law goes back at least as far as Hobbes.
See RICHARD SCHLATFER, PRIVATE PROPERTY: THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA 138-40 (1951).
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voted for new rules establishing a smaller claim size-though almost
certainly not less than ten feet.3'
A Belgian miner's recollection of his first sight of a claim-notice
shows how meaningless a claim was without a community consensus
about acceptable forms of property rights. "I only half understood
what it meant," he said. "I saw very clearly, according to the notices,
that the right of working the claims belonged to those who had
signed them, but I wondered on what they based the right to make
these their territories, and what would happen if another came to
work there."35 These were the right questions.
The precise time and manner in which claims were introduced are
not documented.36 There is, of course, no reason to believe that
property rights in mineral lands appeared throughout the diggings
simultaneously and in the same form. In fact, there are scattered
references to claims in 1848, long before they became ubiquitous,
and these varied in detail from place to place. The earliest datable
reference to something resembling a "claim" occurs in a letter by
Charles Bolivar Sterling, dated July 9, 1848. Sterling reported that at
"Mormon Diggings" he and his companions started out on rather
poor ground, which was the best they could get; then they "bought a
rich prospect from a Mormon and had a prospect given us by Sin-
clair."37 (The Mormons were about to move on to Salt Lake City and
were evidently selling their holdings.) From the Mormon prospect,
they got two to three ounces in part of an afternoon. Sterling does
not say how large his "prospect" was, how much he paid for it, or
how his right was protected. We do know that all of the best spots
were taken, since the newcomers were obliged to start on poor
ground. Given the large quantity of gold that they took out of one
prospect in the course of a few hours, it is possible that the "pro-
spects" they bought and were given were leads or pockets of gold
rather than sections of ground or even holes. If this is so, then evi-
dently the miners of Mormon Diggings recognized a property right
34. See infra Part IV.B.
35. JEAN-NICOLAS PERLOT, GOLD SEEKER: ADVENTURES OF A BELGIAN ARGONAUT
DURING THE GOLD RUSH YEARS 104 (Howard R. Lamar ed., Helen Harding Bretnor, trans.,
Yale Univ. Press 1985) (original title: VIE ET AVENTURES D'UN ENFANT DE L'ARDENNE
(1897-98)).
36. See, e.g., MARY FLOYD WILLIAMS, HISTORY OF THE SAN FRANCISCO COMMITTEE OF
VIGILANCE OF 1851, at 69 (Univ. of California Publications in Hist., No. XII, 1921) (listing at
least four different references to the "earliest" mining claim, ranging from the summer of 1848
to early 1849).
37. Letter from Charles Bolivar Sterling to Thomas 0. Larkin (July 9, 1848, San Fran-
cisco), in 7 THE LARKIN PAPERS: PERSONAL, BUSINESS, AND OFFICIAL CORRESPONDENCE
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in the gold that a miner discovered, even though it was still in the
ground.
Perhaps the first clear reference to a claim as a plot of ground
occurs in a letter by Moses Schallenberger, written on August 16,
1848: "The digings [sic] are pretty much all taken up on Yuba, but I
think I have found a pretty good claim joining Longley & Dent who
are doing vary [sic] well."38 Schallenberger was not at the diggings
when he wrote this letter; he was laying in provisions at Sutter's Fort,
and had sent one of his associates ahead to hold the claim he had
"picked out."39 Schallenberger's statements that he had picked out
the claim, and that he thought it was good, suggest that he had not
yet done much work on it, and point to a piece of land rather than a
hole.
However, another reference in November 1848 to diggings on the
Yuba, at what was later called "Foster's Bar," describes a different
kind of claim. The gold here lay very deep, "the excavations being
sometimes made to a depth of twelve feet before the soil containing
the gold, which was a gravelly clay, was reached."'  Here the
"claims" were simply the holes in which miners were actually at
work. "[A]II the bars upon which men were then engaged in labour
were 'claimed"' this way, Buffum tells us, "a claim at that time being
considered good when the claimant had cleared off the top soil from
any portion of the bar."'" The advantages of property rights are
obvious enough where miners had to invest a considerable amount
of time and labor before they could expect any return. Without such
a right, the miner might find when he reached bedrock that half a
dozen interlopers jumped into his hole to share the rich pickings.
Buffum states that the holes were four to six feet square (that is, four
by four feet to six by six feet)-quite small compared to their depth
of twelve feet-but he does not say what the miners did with the dirt
they extracted or whether bulkheads were left between the holes to
allow others to move between their claims and the water. We must
suppose that this was all worked out between neighbors.2
The final first-hand account of claims in the fall of 1848 also refers
to the Yuba River. Peter H. Burnett and his associates purchased a
38. Letter from Moses Schallenberger to Thomas 0. Larkin (Aug. 16, 1848, New
Helvetia), in 7 THE LARKIN PAPERS, supra note 37, at 338-39.
39. Letter from Moses Schallenberger to Talbot H. Green (Aug. 18, 1848, New Helvetia),
in 7 THE LARKIN PAPERS, supra note 37, at 341.
40. BUFFUM, supra note 32, at 52-53 (Nov. 1848, on Yuba, at what was later Foster's Bar).
41. Id. at 53. Buffum's description of claims is irreconcilable with his statement that Foster,
a storekeeper after whom the Bar was named, had at this time "a claim on a large portion of
the bar." Id. at 50.
42. Id. at 51.
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claim on credit on "Long's Bar" on the Yuba, twenty feet along the
river and reaching back fifty feet.43 The size and shape of this river
claim correspond to the norm established in later mining codes;
moreover, it was recognized as a form of property that could be
bought and sold. The miners of the Yuba River were clearly well on
their way to the property regime characteristic of 1849 and later.'
The basic rules of that new, post-1848 property regime became so
widely accepted that they could be called the common law or custo-
mary law of the diggings. 5 In late 1849, these were summed up in the
following terms by one miner:
As a general rule, it is a practice among the miners to leave each
digger a sufficient space for a hole, upon which nobody has a
right to encroach; from four to ten feet they allow among them-
selves to be sufficient for each, according as they may be more
or less numerous and as digging may be more or less rich. A tool
left in the hole in which a miner is working is a sign that it is not
abandoned yet, and that nobody has a right to intrude there,
and this regulation, which is adopted by silent consent of all, is
generally complied with. '
43. PETER H. BURNETT, RECOLLECTIONS AND OPINIONS OF AN OLD PIONEER 273 (New
York, D. Appleton & Co. 1880). Burnett states that he purchased the claim on November 6,
1848; he may have written this account as late as 1879.
44. Shinn writes that oral laws were passed at a mass-meeting in 1848 and that the laws set
claim sizes at ten feet square; he adds that many of these yielded $10,000. SHINN, supra note
15, at 11. Shinn does not state his source of information; he may have misread the Miners &
Businessmen's Directory for 1856, which provides these details concerning the size of claims
and the income they yielded, but which says nothing about a law code in 1848. See J. HECKEN-
DORN & W.A. WILSON, MINERS & BUSINESSMEN'S DIRECTORY FOR THE YEAR COMMENC-
ING JANUARY 1ST, 1856, at 80 (Columbia, Cal., Clipper Office 1856) (discussing the history of
Jackass Gulch).
45. Senator Stewart of Nevada called the basic rules of mining claims "a sort of Common
Law of the miners" in a speech that was reprinted by the Reporter in an appendix to Sparrow
v. Strong, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 97, 100, n.*, 777-80 (1866). For the full text of Senator Stewart's
speech, see CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3225-29 (1866)). See also WILLIAMS, supra
note 36, at 69-71.
46. WIERZBICKI, supra note 24, at 57. Wierzbicki was in the mines from the time of the
discovery of Mokelumne Hill. It is not clear from his account whether the claim took the form
of the hole or of a square large enough to contain the hole (and perhaps also the dirt taken
from it). See also 1 BAYARD TAYLOR, ELDORADO, OR, ADVENTURES IN THE PATH OF
EMPIRE 101-02 (ch. 10, "Gallop to Stockton") (New York, Putnam 1850) (stating that in 1849,
"[a] man might dig a hole in the dry ravines, and so long as he left a shovel, pick, or crowbar to
show that he still intended working it, he was safe from trespass. His tools might remain there
for months without being disturbed"). There are so many editions of Taylor's book, each with
its own pagination, that I give both the page numbers of the original and the chapter number
and name of later editions. See also C.W.T. BALLENSTEDT, BESCHREIBUNG MEINER REISE
NACH DEN GOLDMINEN CALIFORNIENS 51-52 (Sch6ningen, Druck von J.C. Schmidt in
Helmstedt 1851) (stating that, while he has never seen it happen, if one has left tools on his
claim, and someone else digs and is caught in the act, the neighbors will hang him).
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By the time of this account, it was generally recognized that a miner
could have a "claim," that is, exclusive use of a certain portion of
ground for mining purposes; that the claim would be small-just
large enough to accommodate a hole, which might be no more than
four feet across in crowded diggings; and that tools left on the
ground constituted sufficient notice that it was claimed. Even indivi-
duals in the wilderness staked out claims and expected miners who
arrived after them to respect their property. 7 It hardly seemed ne-
cessary for a party to mark its boundaries before a second party
arrived, but on the other hand, why wait? The notion of a claim was
at this point so ingrained that it appears to have been both necessary
and sufficient to establish property rights as a unilateral act.
Two points about the customary law or default rules remain
obscure. It is not clear whether there were time limits on how long
tools would hold a claim-that is, whether custom included a work
requirement. Bayard Taylor wrote that a pick would hold a claim for
months," but it is difficult to believe that miners expected their
claims to hold good forever if they were not present themselves.
More importantly for the discussion below, I have not been able to
discover whether custom permitted miners to hold multiple claims;
however, the first rule of the Miners' Ten Commandments was that
"Thou shalt have no other claim than one," suggesting that this was a
customary rule. 9 This was a humorous composition, but its jokes
were considered funny because they hit close to home. When codes
were passed, some prohibited miners from holding more than one
claim at a time, while others stated explicitly that miners could hold
only one claim by location but any number by purchase." Most of the
47. See Letter from George McKinley Murrell to Sandy A. Gossom (Apr. 24, 1850, El
Dorado County, "between the middle & north forks of the American river & near Burds
store"), in Murrell Collection (unpublished manuscripts, Huntington Library, catalogued at
36338-36403) (stating that he and his companions took up a claim in a "wild and romantic
place" where there were few other miners). See also FARISS & SMITH, ILLUSTRATED HISTORY
OF PLUMAS, LASSEN & SIERRA COUNTIES, WITH CALIFORNIA FROM 1513 TO 1850, at 151, 287
(San Francisco, Farris & Smith 1882) (stating that in June 1850, the first individuals at Rich
Bar, in what was later Plumas County, staked off claims and then left to get provisions; their
claims were recognized even while they were gone and while the diggings were filling up). The
hMtory was written in 1882, however, and is not a first-hand account.
48. 1 TAYLOR, supra note 46, at 101.
49. J.M. HUTCHINGS, THE MINERS' TEN COMMANDMENTS (San Francisco, Sun Printing
1853). Hutchings's leaflet is the source of the picture on the front cover of this journal, which
illustrates this first "commandment." The date of The Miner's Ten Commandments is rela-
tively late, but it concerns well established customs. This text was reprinted endlessly. Rodman
Paul, the first modern expert on the gold rush, wrote that "it was usually permissible to add to
one's holdings by buying out other locators." PAUL, supra note 1, at 215. I suggest, however,
that the limited evidence points rather to one claim per person as the default rule. See infra
Part IV.B.
50. The Yuba County Mining Laws passed April 11, 1852 are most explicit on the question
of limited holdings: "6th Resolved, That all persons mining may hold one claim by purchase
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published codes are silent on this point, however. Custom could, of
course, have varied regionally.
In sum, the moment of transition from commons to private
property at some diggings in 1848 (but not others) is not docu-
mented. We know that there were some claims in 1848, but the great
change may have happened over the winter of 1848-49, when the
mining population retreated to the cities, compared notes, and real-
ized that the next year would bring a flood of new immigrants. It
appears that the mineral lands were transformed from common
property to private property almost instantaneously in 1849-a sort
of Big Bang of property rights. Possibly, when enough people at one
diggings asserted claims, the whole area crystallized; what had been
commons became a rigid grid of private claims.
The complete absence of property rights could not have lasted
long into 1849 in any case. With the arrival of the forty-niners-some
80,000 men-competition for good mining locations became in-
tense.51 The newcomers were also of a different character from those
who had been in California when gold was discovered in 1848. The
latter were either soldiers and sailors who had no intention of saving
their earnings and settling down, or Americans who had already
settled in California and who knew the lay of the land. Some made
huge sums in 1848 by exploiting their knowledge of the area and the
goodwill of the Indians with whom they had traded in the past; in
1849, they turned to other profitable endeavors, such as operating
gambling salons and speculating in town lots. Those who set out
from the United States in 1849 were farmers and wage-earners who
and one claim by Location. 7th. No person shall hold any more than as specified in the
foregoing Resolution." CLARENCE KING, THE UNITED STATES MINING LAWS AND REGU-
LATIONS THEREUNDER, AND STATE AND TERRITORIAL MINING LAWS: To WHICH ARE
APPENDED LOCAL MINING RULES AND REGULATIONS 277 (Washington, D.C., Government
Printing Office 1885) (compiled as part of tenth census, 1880). In the debate in the Senate
about temporary provision for the working of California gold mines on September 24 and 25,
1850 (which came to nothing), several senators argued in favor of rules allowing miners only
one claim at a time while they were actually at work there. See CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 1st
Sess., Appendix 1370 (1850) (Sen. Fremont of California); id. at 1368 (Sen. Felch of Michigan);
id. at 1363 (Sen. Ewing of Ohio). All three were seeking, as Senator Fremont put it, "to
prevent the possibility of monopolies by moneyed capitalists-and to give to natural capital,
that is to say, to labor and industry, a fair chance to work, and the secure enjoyment of what
they find." Id. at 1370 (Sen. Fremont).
51. An article titled The Gold Region in -the Caifornian of July 15, 1848 estimated that
there were then 3,000 people, including Indians, digging for gold; another article on the same
page estimates about 2,000 persons collecting gold and many more on their way to the mines.
See The Gold Region, CALIFORNIAN (San Francisco), July 15, 1848, at 3. On August 14, 1848,
the Californian estimated that there were about 4,000, not including Indians, at work in the
mines. See The Gold Mine, supra note 23, at 2. The mining population of 1848 was thus much
smaller than that of 1849. The miners of that year collected in a relatively small number of
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invested vast amounts of money and time in what they hoped would
be a successful business endeavor. In December 1849, for instance, a
prospective miner arrived from Arkansas at the end of an eight-
month journey that cost him $700.52 These immigrants could not
afford the risk they had taken; some of the most heartbreaking
accounts from the mines were written by those who stumbled into
Placerville, having barely survived the horrors of the overland trail,
and realized that they would never make money in the diggings.
(Placerville, also called Dry Diggings and Hangtown, was the point
of entry to the mining region for most of the overland emigrants.)
They were family men, not adventurers, to whom clear rules and
boundaries would have been more congenial.
Consider the demographics of the immigration of 1849. Roughly
39,000 young men arrived by sea in that year and some 42,000
overland. 3 They came from every state in the Union, from Europe,
from South America, and from Hawaii; some 76% were native-born
Americans, while 24% were foreign. 4 The northern and western
states (Illinois, Kentucky, Missouri, Tennessee) were particularly
well-represented. Passenger lists of ships that sailed from the
Isthmus of Panama to San Francisco reveal the range of occupations
of the immigrants. The Brig Copiapo carried 137 passengers from
sixteen states, including twenty-six farmers, sixteen traders, eleven
clerks, seven physicians, and a variety of other tradesmen, as well as
a mathematical instrument maker.5 The immigrants on the overland
52. See William Franklin Denniston, Journal (unpublished manuscript, Huntington
Library, catalogued at HM 50660) (entry for Dec. 4, 1849). See also Ho! For California, ALTA
CALIFORNIA (San Francisco), Mar. 1, 1849, at 1 (stating that the five-month sea passage from
New York to San Francisco, around Cape Horn, cost $300 to $400). Stephen Woodin, from
Genoa, spent $680.33 to get to California and expected his return journey to cost $350; he
would have had to make over $1,000 in the mines to recover his traveling expenses, not to
mention his opportunity costs. See Letter from Stephen Woodin to His Wife and Children
(Dec. 15, 1849, North Fork of the American River), in A CALIFORNIA GOLD RUSH MISCEL-
LANY 17 (Jane Bissell Grabhorn ed., 1934). Woodin believed that not one in twenty would
make any money from his expedition. See Letter from Stephen Woodin to his wife and
children (May 17, 1850, North Fork American River) (unpublished manuscript, Huntington
Library, catalogued at 19369-19381). Another miner estimated in 1850 that only one man in
forty would earn enough to pay for his journey to California. See Letter from George
McKinley Murrell to John Grider (Aug. 18, 1850, Humbug Point, South Branch of the North
Fork of the American River), 67 Murrell Collection, supra note 47.
53. See Wright, supra note 2, at 341-42. These estimates are very rough because no one
kept a record of the immigrants arriving via the overland trail; note also that thousands of
Americans left California in 1850 and later, to return to the United States.
54. Seeid. at 332.
55. See Number of Passengers on Board Brig Copiapo, Summer, 1849 (unpublished
manuscript, Bancroft Library, catalogued with William Penn Abrams Diary, 1849-1850, at
Banc MSS C-F 65:2). There are many such lists of members of companies formed for the
voyage to California. See, e.g., Richard Brown Cowley, Journal of a Voyage on the Barque
"Canton"... (Mar. 29, 1849-Nov. 9, 1851), at 103v (unpublished manuscript, Huntington
Library, catalogued at Banc MSS HM 26652).
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trail were drawn from a similar variety of honorable professions. 6 In
short, the miners represented a cross-section of the trades and pro-
fessions then practiced in America-that is, of those who had the
money or credit to pay for the journey but who longed to earn
enough to make them independent of employers or creditors. In age
and sex they were overwhelmingly young and male: 73% of the
population of California in 1850 were between twenty and forty
years of age, and 92% were men."
It is not surprising that property rights in land, however ephem-
eral, should flourish in soil so fertile as American communities. What
is unusual, and requires explanation, is the miners' practice of setting
limits on property rights-but just as we have no account of the
introduction of mining claims, so too we lack information about how
these first claims were limited. My best guess is that the basic
restrictions, including the one-claim rule, were introduced at rich,
crowded diggings where outsiders were eager to take over claims as
soon as they were abandoned, while claimholders needed some re-
cognition of their claims that would enable them to be away for short
periods of time without being dispossessed." Differences of opinion
were inevitable, and yet there is no evidence of violence during this
period. Miners perhaps jostled for places, reached an informal con-
sensus, and possibly even resorted, American-style, to a general
meeting, after which, again American-style, majority rule governed.
In short, I suggest that the first claims may have emerged as a
compromise between those who were at work at rich diggings and
those who wanted to move in. I shall argue below that the miners
soon adopted an ideology and a conception of self-interest based on
their experiences. Their position can be summed up as a rejection of
a fee-simple interest in mining claims on the grounds that this would
result in the monopoly of the diggings by capitalists and the exclu-
sion of individual miners from the chance to strike it rich. That
conviction then played a role in the drafting of later mining codes.
56. See REID, supra note 19, at 11-19.
57. See Doris Marion Wright, The Making of Cosmopolitan California: An Analysis of
Immigration, 1848-1870(pt. 2), 20 CAL. HIST. SOC. Q., 65, 73 (1941).
58. This explanation finds some support in Kimball Webster's story about taking over a
claim even though the claimholder had left an old rocker there; Webster and his partners
ignored the rocker because they had heard that the claimholder was up the river building a
cabin. "We thought they were not entitled to hold a claim here and one in the mountains at the
same time," Webster wrote, so they moved the cradle out of the hole and started work.
KIMBALL WEBSTER, THE GOLD SEEKERS OF '49: A PERSONAL NARRATIVE OF THE OVER-
LAND TRAIL AND ADVENTURES IN CALIFORNIA AND OREGON FROM 1849 TO 1854, at 113
(George Waldo Brown ed., 1917). This narrative is said to be based on a journal that the
author kept in the mines.
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Wherever property in land was introduced, claims appear to have
become the norm at once and to have been enforced by the
community. From the moment that claims were recognized, no rea-
sonable man would try to take another's claim by force, because his
victim (if he were alive), his partners, his friends, and probably some
other third parties, would throw him off. 9 Ultimately, the rules were
backed by the threat of force, but by community force rather than
violence between individuals.
This story is very different from the one offered by Umbeck, who
supposes that the miners' readiness to fight over claims explains the
terms of even the later codes of the 1850s and 1860s. Many of the
weaknesses of Umbeck's theory are listed by Zerbe and Anderson;
they note that it fails to account for the observance of majority rule
in the mines, for the miners' own accounts of their motivations, and
for the almost complete absence of violence among Americans in the
early gold rush as opposed to the many examples of conflict between
Americans and other ethnic groups.' Readers of Umbeck may also
contrast his picture of the diggings with John Reid's meticulous
analysis of journals written on the overland trail, which revealed that
the emigrants regarded one another's property rights as all but
inviolable." Since these emigrants were the forty-niners on whom
Umbeck based his study, the onus is on Umbeck to show that, in the
mines, a man's property was nothing more than what he was able to
take and defend against all challengers.
Zerbe and Anderson argue that Americans brought with them
shared norms that enabled them to create and sustain a generally
acceptable property regime without resorting to violence. The
authors point out, first, that the Americans were able to organize
quickly and effectively because they shared a public culture of
meetings and respect for majority rule. Zerbe and Anderson further
59. Miners were reluctant to settle disputes by force even in isolated areas, at some
distance from a community that might choose to involve itself in their affairs. See, e.g., David
Cosad, Journal of a Trip to California by the Overland Route and Life in the Gold Diggings
During 1849-1850 (unpublished manuscript, California Hist. Soc., microfilm in Bancroft
Library, catalogued at Banc MSS C-F 50, pt II, reel 2:10) (entry for Oct. 1, 1849). Cosad
describes an incident in which two parties claimed the same stretch of river for a damming
operation, a situation that was more likely to become violent than a dispute over a placer
claim. Some members of Cosad's party wanted to use force, but in the end, "one of their men
went to the village & left it to Disinterested persons and they brought in that It must be settled
by casting lots which was done & the Michigan men won it which toock [sic] all of that day."
Id.
60. Umbeck himself notes that the mining codes anticipated conflicts between "group
members" (presumably those who had voted for the code) and not with outsiders. UMBECK,
supra note 9, at 148 n.23. He also notes that there was in fact very little violence in 1849 and
1850. Id at 142-43 n.37. For contemporary evidence of the absence of violence in the mines,
see REID, supra note 19, at 5.
61. See REID, supra note 19.
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suggest that miners willingly abided by and enforced the rules
because the rules were "fair" by some standard that the miners
brought with them from elsewhere in America, or even in some
absolute sense. They characterize this fairness as "Lockean," that is,
''a moral concept of the relationship between what one earns and
what one receives.
Zerbe and Anderson's first point about the importance of the
American training in self-government is clearly right. I submit, how-
ever, that the other norms on which they believe property rights in
the mines were based are too broad to have explanatory force. They
describe these norms as Lockean fairness and Jacksonian demo-
cracy.63 By Lockean fairness, they mean first, that one deserved what
one worked for, and second, that no one should hold more property
than he could use. They use the term Jacksonian democracy to
describe the ideal of the autonomous free producer. Zerbe and
Anderson predicted that a property regime founded on these norms
would favor the individual producer over wage labor, as that in the
diggings did.
It seems to me, however, that Lockean property norms are not
well represented in the mining codes. In the first place, the principle
that one deserves what one works for is ambiguous, especially since
"what one earns" and "just deserts" are cultural constructs. Second,
the idea that no one should hold more than he can use was funda-
mental to the property regime in the mines, but it was neither
Locke's position nor that of the majority of Americans. Locke wrote
that the rule against holding more than one can use only applied
before the introduction of money, to which, he assumes, everyone
tacitly consented.' Locke's own opinion about the rightness or
wrongness of the vast inequalities of wealth in the modern world has
been the subject of much debate,65 but he did, at any rate, recognize a
right to alienate and accumulate property.' Whatever his views, the
right to property that one has acquired by purchase or gift, however
much that might be, has always been an important element of
fairness in the United States and is fundamental to the common law
of property.
62. Zerbe & Anderson, supra note 9, at 121.
63. Id at 122.
64. See JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 50 (1690) ("Men have
agreed to disproportionate and unequal Possession of the Earth, they having by a tacit and
voluntary consent found out a way, how a man may fairly possess more land than he himself
can use the byproduct of, by receiving in exchange for the overplus, Gold and Silver, which
may be hoarded up without injury to any one.").
65. See A. JOHN SIMMONS, THE LOCKEAN THEORY OF RIGHTS 298-306 (1992).
66. Id. at 231.
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The miners rejected the right of accumulation, however, at least in
part, and stressed one of the other aspects of fairness-that de-
scribed by Zerbe and Anderson as "producerism."67 In other words,
the miners selected and adapted some eastern property norms and
played down others. The rules hammered out in the first flush camps
of 1849 then became the baseline for "fairness"; they were
internalized as new norms. Miners moving from one camp to another
took with them their ideas of the rights and wrongs of property in
mineral lands. Of course, there were limits to the normative power of
rules forged in the heat and pressure of a few mining camps in late
1848 and 1849. Newcomers to the mines showed great deference to
the customs of experienced miners, but it is unlikely that they would
have submitted to the rules worked out in the early mining camps
unless they believed them to be tenable, practicable, and in the
newcomers' own self-interest. I shall argue that the ideology of the
miners did indeed correspond to their perceived self-interest.
Zerbe and Anderson go on to discuss three particular details of the
property regime in the mines: claim size, work requirements, and the
first-come, first-serve rule of allocation.' By their account, the "pro-
ducerism" idea of fairness, on its own, can at most explain the
existence of work requirements. The rules for claim size and allo-
cation, Zerbe and Anderson argue, were based on efficiency as well
as fairness. In fact, they suggest that the fairness of the rule-making
procedure by majority vote was sufficient to fulfill the fairness
requirement of the rules themselves, a position that significantly
reduces the role of fairness in determining the nature of the property
regime. The main problem with this part of Zerbe and Anderson's
analysis is that they draw most of their data from the preserved
codes, which date to the 1850s and later.69 By this time, the mining
communities had become larger and more diverse, and also more
disorderly and violent, than they were at first. The ideals and inter-
ests of the miners are better reflected in the rules and regulations of
the early diggings, as I hope to demonstrate.
The next two sections will examine the process by which the
miners reached a consensus about property rights in land and the
nature of the rights they created. I shall then turn to the question of
the values and concerns reflected in the codes. The great mystery is
why claimholders did not vote to give themselves full property rights
in their claims-assuming they outnumbered the outsiders at the
67. See Zerbe & Anderson, supra note 9, at 122.
68. See id.at 128-35.
69. Zerbe and Anderson rely in part on the data collected in A Theory of Property Rights,
UMBECK, supra note 9, which was drawn from the published codes.
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meeting and were able to have their say-instead of restricting their
own rights in so many respects. The first key to the mystery, I shall
argue, is the ideological argument made for restrictions. The rhetoric
of egalitarianism and of the triumph of labor over capital, which had
been used to describe the events of 1848, acquired normative force in
1849. The second element is self-interest. The miners who held
claims at any given diggings could easily imagine themselves in the
position of the propertyless; indeed, they were quite likely to have
exhausted their claims and to be propertyless themselves in the near
future. They knew that they would not be able to acquire further
claims if others had managed to buy up most of the diggings in the
interim. Because claimholders and non-claimholders were thus effec-
tively behind a veil of ignorance when they drafted their codes, they
were determined not to promote one group at the expense of the
other.
A further advantage to the strict limits on property rights, of which
the miners may or may not have been aware at the time, is that they
facilitated self-government. Major decisions such as whether to pass
a mining code were made by all of the miners assembled in mass
meetings. Henry Hansmann has argued persuasively that direct dem-
ocracy of this kind is most likely to succeed if the participants have
equal interests.' Here, too, the miners may have learned a lesson
from the several different kinds of property interests on the agri-
cultural land of California (squatters' rights and those derived from
Mexican land grants) and the almost inevitable clashes among those
who held different interests. Newcomers to the mines were all the
more likely to accept the rules as they found them when they became
aware of these advantages.
III. MINERS' MEETINGS
We have seen that in the course of 1849, probably very early in
that year, a common law or customary law of mining either emerged
spontaneously or sprung from the earliest, verbal codes, and that this
custom in turn influenced the subsequent written codes. The custo-
mary law dealt with the big questions: there should be claims, they
should be small, the claimholder must give notice. Such rules were
based, evidently, on experience and a sort of natural logic. However,
custom was terribly fuzzy around the edges; there was no natural
solution to the number of claims one could hold, to the amount of
time one had to work land, to how one marked the boundaries of
70. Hansmann, supra note 14.
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one's claim, and so on. The codes were designed to settle some of
these essential details.
The first question to address is when and how miners held a meet-
ing and defined their property regime. None of our sources bothers
to describe meetings in any detail, perhaps because they were too
ordinary (these authors do give vivid accounts of unfamiliar events
such as lynching). We have little information about who called the
meetings, who attended, what views were expressed, or by what
majority the resolutions were eventually passed. The little evidence
there is suggests that the first law codes were enacted in various cir-
cumstances, and not just when a certain critical mass of miners had
been reached in the diggings.
The most straightforward case is that in which the miners drafted
their rules before the land became available. Such a situation might
arise, for example, when miners enacted a code as the first step
towards taking over claims held by foreign miners.7 Here, the pur-
pose of the code was first to create a legal sanction for what the
miners were about to do; and, second, to create a property regime
for the Americans who took over the foreigners' territory. The men
knew very little as yet about the terrain, where their claims would be,
or how much gold there was. It seems obvious that in this case most
men would participate in the meeting and that most would vote for a
regime of equal shares; fairness and self-interest lead to the same
result. In one case where Americans passed a code before throwing
out the foreigners, namely the "Mokelumne Hill" incident, the land
in question was exceptionally rich-perhaps the richest in the history
of the California gold rush. In this case, the code called for ten-foot-
square claims, which were too small to work effectively;" evidently,
all of the miners who participated in the "war" against the French
wanted a piece of the pie.73 This is a perfect example of a code
drafted behind a Rawlsian veil of ignorance. The information avail-
able was limited to the amount of land and the number of miners; no
one knew which parcel would be assigned to him.
71. See, e.g., John Hovey, Historical Account of the Troubles Between the Chileans &
American Miners in the Calaveros Mining District (unpublished manuscript, Huntington
Library, catalogued at HM 4384) (Iowa Log Cabin incident) (entries for Dec. 6, 1849-Jan. 4,
1850) [hereinafter Hovey, Historical Account]. This is a transcription written by Hovey himself
from his journal, which includes the same account. See Hovey, Journal of a Voyage 84-89
(unpublished manuscript, Huntington Library, catalogued at HM 322) [hereinafter Hovey,
Journal].
72. See infra Part IV.B. for a discussion of claim sizes.
73. See, e.g., Hovey, Journal, supra note 71, at 129-39 (Mokelumne Hill incident, March
1851) (describing how American miners drove French miners from their very rich diggings at
Mokelumne Hill, after voting that claims would henceforth be marked off at ten feet square).
Hovey writes that the claims were so close together that they had "to wait for one another so
as to make room for the Dirt and Stones." Id. at 139.
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Another situation in which miners had to reach decisions about
claim sizes, and about the rules for holding claims before the land
became available, occurred when the miners gathered around an
area that was known to be rich, but that was underwater at the time
they passed their code.74 For example, miners set up their tents in Big
Canyon on the Middle Fork of the American River (probably in El
Dorado) as early as February 1850, many months before it would be
possible to mine there. Based on limited prospecting at the end of
the 1849 season, the fourteen-mile long canyon was believed to be
rich. By May, there were thousands of miners there waiting for the
waters to recede. Each was entitled to a twenty-foot claim, which
could be registered with a clerk for one dollar.75 Quite possibly, each
arriving miner took the claim abutting the one last registered; in that
case, he would have no choice about the position of his claim and
would also know nothing about its potential.76
The transition from commons to claims was more complex-and
often more underhanded-when a small group of miners discovered
promising diggings as yet unknown to the rest of the population.
Here there was a temptation to exclude others by fair means or foul.
It was possible to do this so long as the new arrivals came along in
twos and threes-that is, so long as the group in possession out-
numbered the other parties that came by. This is the state of affairs
that one might have expected to find across California-the situation
that Umbeck postulates as the norm.
One way to keep diggings private was to pass rules granting one's
own party very large claims or very many claims. Daniel B. Woods
provided a particularly full account of how he and his companions
were excluded from a diggings by the sham "rules" of the miners
who were already there. The newcomers started to dig at an un-
touched and unmarked spot, but the older miners drove them off.
Asked "why they had not left their pick or spade there, according to
the custom" to mark their claims, the miners replied, essentially, that
they had divided the diggings up amongst themselves and were
prepared to defend them. Woods writes, "All the miners there were
74. See, e.g., "J.M.E.," Letter from the Mines, ALTA CALIFORNIA (San Francisco)
(Steamer Edition), Aug. 31, 1849, at 1 ("I am told there are thousands encamped on the banks
of the Tuolumne waiting the falling of the waters.., who are anxious to make an early
selection and appropriation of the ground.").
75. See "Gold Hunter," From the Middle Fork, PLACER TIMES (Sacramento), May 3,
1850, at 4.
76. This is how claims were later made along a quartz vein, although the situation there
was different in that no one knew what dips and turns the vein might make. See 1 Placer
County Records: Mining Notices, 1850-1856 (unpublished manuscript, Bancroft Library, cata-
logued at Banc MSS C A 293 (in which quartz claims were numbered and evidently taken up
sequentially as claimants presented themselves).
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bound to stand by each other in maintaining their claims, which were
known to each other .... [M]ost of the ground is held in this way,
without being marked off or designated."" Their magistrate (called
an alcalde) 5 was as bad as the rest and was reported to hold thirty
claims.
It took Woods and his partners some time to get the message that
''comparatively a few persons have undertaken to monopolize most
of the gold soil in the gulch."79 They were ejected from five places
before they finally moved on. This area was probably not very rich,
although Wood and the others never worked long enough on any
one claim to get down to the gold layer. If it had been profitable,
enough miners might have streamed in from all sides to push the
current claimants down to one claim apiece.
There are several further examples from the earliest years of the
gold rush of miners trying to keep diggings for themselves in this
way, and in later years, according to James Carson, this was often
done by miners who "knew nothing of the evils of which they were
laying the foundation."'
Miners who voted themselves extra-large claims knew that late-
comers might later push them down to shares of a more reasonable
size. For instance, in May 1850, miners who had opened new diggings
in El Dorado County held a meeting and resolved that they should
each have thirty feet along the river. "That is sufficient to give us a
whole season's work if we can hold it," one of them wrote, "but
should the stream prove as rich as I think it will I am afraid they will
cut claims down to 15 feet."'" "They" were presumably the other
miners who would flock to the bar if it proved profitable. Crowds did
77. See DANIEL B. WOODS, SIXTEEN MONTHS AT THE GOLD DIGGINGS 115-16 (New
York, Harper 1851) (Feb. 21-26, 1850, French Bar/Mormon Gulch, Tuolumne).
78. See infra notes 106-109 and accompanying text.
79. WOODS, supra note 77, at 115.
80. Letter from James H. Carson, To the Miners of California, SAN JOAQUIN REPUBLI-
CAN, Mar. 12, 1853, reprinted in CASTRO, supra note 22, at 172, 174. Carson adds, "As an
instance-if there is a new discovery made at present, the few who make it call in their
relations and friends; then measure the best of the ground off, and divide it into claims of such
size as will cover it, let it be five or five hundred feet, and then proclaim that the rule of those
diggings.... [Almost all of] these claimants have numerous claims elsewhere, and have taken
up these for the sole purpose of selling them to the highest bidder." Id. at 175.
81. Letter from George McKinley Murrell to Robert F. Strange (May 5, 1850, El Dorado
County), in Murrell Collection, supra note 47. Another miner recalled that when the mines
were opened around Nevada City, one man claimed all the diggings as far as his rifle carried.
Faced with this problem, "[t]he miners saw that something must be done." CHARLES D.
FERGUSON, EXPERIENCES OF A FORTY-NINER DURING THIRTY-FOUR YEARS' RESIDENCE IN
CALIFORNIA AND AUSTRALIA 157 (Frederick T. Wallace ed., Cleveland, Williams 1888).
Umbeck cites Ferguson as saying that there was at first no limit on claim size, and that the first
party in a ravine had the exclusive right to mine it. UMBECK, supra note 9, at 90 n.ll.
Ferguson's recollections were written down forty years after the gold rush, and so I have not
used them as a primary source.
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in fact overwhelm the discoverers of Stewart's Diggings at Yreka.
There, four or six men managed to take out 120 pounds of gold be-
fore they were disturbed, but a month after news of their discovery
leaked out, there were 1,000 men on the spot. At some early point,
the newcomers presumably agreed that the first-comers held too
much, and called a meeting to set limits on just how much each indi-
vidual could hold. 82
It is not clear how the diggings were distributed, or redistributed,
when the miners' meeting set a new maximum claim size. One possi-
bility is that claimholders had to indicate which claim or portion of a
claim they wished to keep, and the rest of their former holdings
became jumpable. This is apparently what happened at Murphy's
Diggings when the miners resolved "that from and after this date no
person shall hold more than one claim"; the Sonora Herald advised
miners who were absent from their claims at Murphy's to hurry back
lest their claims be jumped. 3 An account by Daniel Woods suggests
that smaller parcels of ground between two full-sized claims were
sometimes worth working-or jumping. Woods says that two neigh-
bors asked a newcomer to arbitrate for them in a dispute over the
boundaries between their ten-foot claims. The newcomer measured
off their claims and took the narrow strip between them for his
trouble; this strip yielded him $7435. ' When the miners reduced the
maximum claim size, therefore, the claimholders may simply have
given up part of their existing claims. On the other hand, a relatively
late source states that after a meeting standardizing claim sizes, the
land was marked out by the alcalde or a specially elected commit-
tee. The first arrivals then had the first choice of claims, while the
others were allowed to make their selections in the order of the date
of their arrival. In some such cases, the miners who voted for the
code may have been behind a veil of ignorance, not knowing in ad-
vance where their land would be, let alone whether it would be rich
or poor.
82. I have not encountered contemporary accounts of newcomers outvoting the first
workers, but see the description of crowds rushing to new diggings in the summer of 1850 in
FARISS & SMITH, supra note 47, at 151 ("In many cases where the first workers had measured
off generous-sized claims, the newcomers called a meeting, made laws reducing the size of
claims, and proceeded to stake out their locations.").
83. Mining News, SONORA HERALD, Aug. 10, 1850, at 2.
84. WOODS, supra note 77, at 57 (July 9, 1849, Salmon Falls, El Dorado County).
85. See FARISS & SMITH, supra note 47, at 287; UMBECK, supra note 9, at 93-94. There was
an opportunity for favoritism here. Richard Brown Cowley, who arrived at the St. Antonia
diggings in about February 1851, before the ground was workable, said that he got a parti-
cularly good claim. "I had a little difficulty in securing this claim, but being acquainted with the
Alcalde or Justice of the Peace and having a few friends, I had the preference." Cowley, supra
note 55, at 96r.
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Another way for first-comers to take advantage of their priority
was to confirm existing claims while providing that future claims
should be of a certain maximum size. 6 This appears to be an ideal
arrangement from the original claimholders' point of view, and it is
surprising that we do not see it more often.
In yet other cases there can hardly be said to have been first-
comers, so quickly did the mob arrive. These are the legendary
situations in which a small party struck gold and thousands immedi-
ately rushed to the scene. Here, indeed, the miners called a meeting
within days to pass a code, before much work had been done and
before there were strong vested interests to be defended (except for
the first-comers' interest in their choice locations). William Reed
provided a particularly detailed account of a first miners' meeting
under such circumstances at a new site near Kelsey's Diggings in
October 1851.87 Mining was slow at this time; many of the men there
had apparently given up on making their pile and going home -they
had settled in and were content to make board. Then one day, a
Dutchman sunk a hole in an area that no one had tried before, and
began taking out one dollar a pan. The miners of Kelsey's flung
down their cards, seized their picks, and staked out thirty-foot claims
as near to the Dutchman as they could (thirty feet was presumably
the maximum claim size at the main camp). On a Friday, Reed
reports that claims are beginning to pay. On Monday, he notes that
there "is now considerable excitement about the new diggings, and
people are flocking to them from all quarters[;] there is not enough
chance for them all." Finally, on Tuesday, the miners "had a meeting
to form rules and regulations concerning the claims &c. and decided
to call the place Deep Ravine; there were some 50 present."'
Finally, at some camps, a code was enacted when it was needed-
that is, when a dispute arose that could not be resolved by reference
to the mining customs.' Here the rules were passed ex post facto,
86. See, e.g., HECKENDORN & WILSON, supra note 44, at 83 (reprinting laws of Chinese
Camp, Sept. 17, 1850, including the following provisions: "Art. 1: That all claims now made and
worked by the present settlers, shall be held by them. Art. 2: That on and after the present
meeting all claims shall be confined to twenty feet square").
87. See William F. Reed, Journal (unpublished manuscript, Bancroft Library, catalogued
at Banc MSS C-F 214) (entries for Sept. 29-Oct. 14, 1851).
88. Id (entry for Oct. 17, 1851). In this case, the miners may have wanted to protect their
right to hold more than one claim, since we know Reed and his partners later purchased two
claims in addition to those they held by preemption. See id.
89. See SHINN, supra note 15, at 20 (discussing the codes of Saw Mill Flat, Brown's Flat,
Mormon Gulch, and Tuttle Town). Saw Mill Flat began its code with the words, "Whereas this
precinct is deficient in Mining Laws and Regulations, and disputes arise therefrom. Therefore,
resolved, that we the miners of Saw Mill Flat in Convention assembled, do pledge ourselves to
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although, naturally, with an eye to the future. The large body of sub-
sidiary rules that would be necessary in any camp was probably
created entirely through individual judgments, which may or may not
have been remembered when a similar dispute arose at a later date.'
In the remaining cases, meetings appear to have been held almost
routinely, when there was a feeling that the population was getting
large enough to require rigid rules.
What little evidence there is about attendance at miners' meetings
suggests that they were open to all Americans, that is, to anglophone
American citizens and others who intended to become citizens. It is
not surprising that everyone present had a vote; after all, a code
enacted solely by claimholders would not carry much weight with
outsiders. Nevertheless, the openness of the voting system is signifi-
cant. Voters included miners who had just arrived, who had no claim,
and who had no immediate prospect of a claim.9 Clearly, outsiders
wished the limits on claimholders' rights to be defined as precisely as
possible, since those limits marked where the outsiders' rights began.
For example, a newcomer who knew the rules would not be "bluffed
off" an abandoned hole by another miner who asserted that the
claim was his but was not able to prove it.92
On the other hand, there is little evidence that attendance at
meetings was compulsory, though Charles Howard Shinn states that
this was the case in "ten or twelve" camps.93 It seems that there were
always enough people to draft and enact laws; in this sense, trans-
action costs do not appear to have been a problem. The immigrants
were experienced in the routine of self-organization. They could
base their own code on customary law and the codes of other
districts, so that the meetings need not have taken much time. In any
case, those who did not have claims had little else to do. Meetings
and elections were also frequently scheduled on a Sunday, a day that
90. This is one of the complaints of the miner signing himself "Tuolumne": "It is well
known that mining laws are often made to suit particular instances-are, in fact, ex post facto
and often go into disuse as soon as the emergency expires." "Tuolumne," A Title to the Land
-The Present Tenure, SONORA HERALD, Oct. 23, 1852, at 1. This was the first of "Tuo-
lumne's" two letters on the subject. See infra notes 176-182 and accompanying text.
91. See, e.g., Isaac Barker, Diary of a Voyage around Cape Horn ... and of Life in the
Mines near Mormon Island, Calif. Sept. 18 1849 to Dec. 31 1850 (unpublished manuscript,
Huntington Library, San Marino, Cal., catalogued at HM 19366) (diary entries for April 1850,
Mormon Island) (indicating that Barker attended a meeting concerning mining claims at
Georgetown (El Dorado County) although he had just arrived there and did not have a claim).
See also Letter from David Cosad (Aug. 1, 1849), in Cosad, supra note 59 (stating that Cosad
planned to vote at a meeting to pass laws at Coloma, although he had just arrived there and
intended to leave immediately).
92. See Barker, supra note 91 (entry for Apr. 23, 1850, Ford's Bar) (relating that Barker's
party refused to be bluffed off their hole by another miner who could not establish his claim).
93. SHINN, supra, note 15, at 20.
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many miners set aside for business and chores.94 Furthermore, the
opportunity cost of time taken from mining to attend meetings is
difficult to calculate, because any given claim held an unknown but
limited amount of gold, which would be used up in two weeks in any
event; against this, one must of course set the shortness of the mining
season. It is not clear from the sources whether the average miner
cared much about the actual terms of the code, except that a number
of miners do report specifically that they attended meetings "to
exclude foreigners," an issue that evidently generated some zeal.95
These individuals do not say why they were so keen to expel non-
Americans, but motives probably included patriotism, solidarity, and
greed for the land the outsiders would have to abandon. Indeed,
solidarity and an assertion of Americanness may well have been
primary reasons for attending meetings in general.
It hardly mattered whether all of the miners in a given district
attended the meeting to draw up a mining code, so long as they
acquiesced in the choices made by the majority who were present.
Indeed, the stability of the regime depended on Americans' propen-
sity not only to hold elections and to draw up resolutions, but also to
abide by majority rule.' The population of any given diggings was
constantly changing, and yet the newcomers conformed to the rules
drawn up before they arrived. It was not only Americans who
respected the will of the majority, but also those who hoped to be
treated like Americans-such as a party of Danes, for example, who
never spoke Danish even among themselves except when they sus-
pected someone of deliberately eavesdropping on conversations
about work.9' "As a matter of course," one wrote, "we were desirous
of fulfilling the requirements of the law-which had been passed by
94. See, e.g., Barker, supra note 91 (entry for Sunday, Apr. 14, 1850, describing a meeting
at Georgetown); Carter, supra note 24 (entry for July 5, 1849, describing a meeting on July 4);
Joseph Warren Wood, Diaries of Crossing the Plains in 1849 and Life in the Diggings from
1849 to 1853 (unpublished manuscript, Huntington Library, catalogued at HM 318) (entry for
Sunday, Jan. 20, 1850, recording a meeting at Jacksonville); id. (entry for Sunday, Mar. 31,
1850, describing election speeches).
95. Letter from Allen Varner to David Varner (Mar. 5, 1850, Rector's Bar, Placer
County), in Varner, Letters (unpublished manuscripts, Huntington Library, catalogued at HM
39980). See also Wood, supra note 94 (entry for July 28, 1850, Jacksonville) ("went to Jack-
[sonville] & voted out foreigners"); Hovey, Journal, supra note 71 (citing a code passed on
Dec. 9, 1849, in which the first article prohibited foreigners from working in the diggings). But
see Cosad, supra note 59 (entry for Aug. 1, 1849, Coloma) ("It was Election day to chose [sic]
some officers, for the people could not live well without law as the people was verry [sic] much
mixed with Spanish[.] [T]hey established some laws part Spanish & part American.").
96. See Zerbe & Anderson, supra note 9, at 125-27.
97. See PETER JUSTESEN, TWO YEARS' ADVENTURES OF A DANE IN THE CALIFORNIA
GOLD MINES 30 (John Bellows trans., Gloucester, England, Bellows 1865).
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mutual agreement of all concerned; and we were anxious to do our
part in carrying it out."9'
Possessing a claim and observing the code were in themselves
closely identified with one's identity as an American. The miners in
general were adamant that foreigners ought not to be allowed to dig,
and many codes included provisions excluding non-Americans from
the mines. In other words, they identified property rights with
citizenship- although they never said so in those terms. Where
foreigners had secured particularly rich diggings, the Americans
were ready to unite and to drive them out by force. Individuals
carried on their own campaigns as well. John Hovey and his partners
threw the tools off French claims and simply took them over; they
later threatened to shoot two Mexicans whose claims they had
apparently jumped.' It was to some extent a point of honor not to do
that kind of thing to a fellow American.
IV. THE MINING CODES
The "mining codes" or "laws" or "rules and regulations" governed
the permissible size of a claim, what sort of notice was required, how
often it had to be worked, and sometimes the process of dispute
resolution. The preserved codes of each district contain only the
most fundamental rules governing property. Supplemental rules
were often passed at specially convened meetings, often as part of
the ruling in a dispute between miners, and were thus hardly distin-
guishable from legal judgments intended to serve as precedents.
Other rules, written or unwritten, went beyond the regulation of
property rights to include a basic criminal code."° Only the mining
regulations were printed, however, and were posted at multiple loca-
tions in some camps. The preambles of codes from the mid- to late
1850s indicate that miners in some diggings intended their codes to
be a kind of Constitution for a civil society of their own creation."'
One preamble, indeed, directly echoes the language of the U.S. Con-
stitution.1" The miners knew, of course, that their society was a very
98. Id. at 40.
99. Hovey, Journal, supra note 71 (entry for Apr. 5, 1850).
100. See, e.g., Woods, supra note 77, at 126-29 (transcribing Jacksonville criminal code of
Jan. 20,1850).
101. See, e.g., KING, supra note 50, at 300 (reprinting Rules and Regulations of Dry Creek,
Brownsville Mining District, Yuba County, Apr. 7, 1860). See also Wood, supra note 94 (entry
for Jan. 20, 1850).
102. See KING, supra note 50, at 279 (reprinting Regulations of Warren Hill, Plumas
County, Oct. 22, 1853) ("We the miners and citizens of Warren Hill, in order to form a more
perfect and correct understanding amongst ourselves and all others that may come among
us.... to establish Justice and secure harmony, do enact and draft the Laws as follows.").
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temporary one, but they believed themselves to be playing an impor-
tant role as a harbinger of American democracy. In total, some 500
placer camps in California enacted mining codes, 3 about 150 of
which were collected for the Department of the Interior." Very few
of these date to 1849 or the first half of 1850, '05 but fortunately, many
individual rules are mentioned in miners' journals and letters, from
which it is possible to reconstruct the basic elements of the earliest
codes and their variants.
A large number of camps elected an alcalde' ° to hear civil and
criminal disputes and to act as a general law enforcement agent. The
alcalde was originally a Mexican official. On paper, his job was to
maintain good order, preside over council meetings, execute ordi-
nances and decrees, arbitrate between disputants, and act as a judge
of first instance. In practice, however, the alcalde of a small town was
its only official and played the role of mayor, judge, and justice of the
peace until the citizens voted to replace him. The Americans who
were in California before the gold rush adopted the institution of
alcalde without the Mexican laws that he had administered. In 1848,
all but four or five of the alcaldes in California were Americans. 7
Colonel Mason recognized the expanded role that the alcaldes had
assumed in practice; indeed, given the vacuum of government in
California at the time, he had little choice."8 The miners at most of
the early diggings elected one of themselves as alcalde (after 1850,
justice of the peace) to manage their day-to-day government, such as
it was, and to hear disputes. Other codes provided for dispute
resolution by arbitrators, half selected by each party, or by jury. In
all cases, the miners assembled en masse were the ultimate authority;
they could depose an alcalde at will and put another in his place. In
practice, the assembled miners often managed and decided criminal
cases even when these were nominally in the hands of an alcalde and
a jury. They could also enact new regulations that might change the
103. SHINN, supra note 15, at 9.
104. See KING, supra note 50, at 14. For the 500 mining districts, each with its own code,
see BROWNE, supra note 6, at 226.
105. The earliest code I have found is that of Calaveras Diggings, Dec. 9, 1849, passed
mainly to enact a rule under which the Americans could expel the Chileans from their rich
claims. See Hovey, Journal, supra note 71 (entry for Jan. 1850).
106. The history of the office of alcalde in California is discussed by Theodore Grivas,
Alcalde Rule: The Nature of Local Government in Spanish and Mexican California, 40 CAL.
HIST. SOC'Y 0. 11 (1961). See also SHINN, supra note 15, at 182-98 (discussing the function of
the alcalde in the mining camps).
107. See Grivas, supra note 106, at 24-25.
108. In a letter to the Adjutant General in Washington, dated April 19, 1848, Colonel
Mason wrote that the alcaldes had been the only civil officers in California during the two
preceding years. See CALIFORNIA AND NEW MEXICO, supra note 3, at 573. For further
discussion of Mason, see supra note 4.
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property rights of every claimholder in the district.'" The ancient
institution of alcalde was thus Americanized.
Mining codes ' generally included three core provisions: they
established maximum claim sizes, they determined whether or not to
restrict the number of claims one miner could hold, and they set
notice requirements. Their basic structure was probably introduced
by immigrants familiar with the lead mines of the Mississippi val-
ley."' The most striking thing about all three provisions is that they
tend to limit or restrict a miner's right to a claim.
Because the earliest preserved codes contain some anomalies, I
reproduce here a mining code of a slightly later date as an example
of a simple set of rules and regulations for dry diggings similar to
rules in force in 1849. These are the regulations for Rockwell Hill in
Nevada County, probably passed in June 1852:
LAWS
We the undersigned Claim Holders on this Hill subscribe to the
following laws by which our claims on this Hill are to be
governed.
1st. This hill shall be named and known as Rockwell Hill.
2d. No person shall hold more than one claim by location.
3d. No claim shall exceed one hundred feet square.
4th. Every claim not registered in the books of the Recorder
within ten days after being taken up shall be liable to be jump'd.
5th. All transfers shall be registered in the Books of the
recorder.
6th. Each claim shall be worked at least one day during a period
of at least sixty consecutive days, or otherwise be liable to be
jumped[.] Except a Company or Individual holding two or more
claims, in which case it will be sufficient for said Company or
109. See, e.g., BROWNE, supra note 6, at 228.
110. This section will discuss only the rules for dry diggings and claims along the rivers
(river claims), not river-damming claims or quartz claims. The rules for such damming compa-
nies were completely different from those for individual claims along a river; a damming com-
pany was entitled to all of the riverbed that it exposed by diverting the water along some other
route. Quartz mining was introduced at the end of 1850, but it yielded very little gold until the
end of the decade. Ninety-nine percent of the gold produced in California between 1851 and
1860 came from placer diggings. See PAUL, supra note 1, at 144.
111. See, e.g., Jesse Macy, Institutional Begnnings in a Western State, 3 ANNALS IOWA
321, 322 (1898) (stating that the lead miners of Dubuque passed rules and regulations on June
17, 1830, adopting the regulations used in Illinois, but setting claim sizes at 200 yards square, to
be worked one day in six, and providing for arbitration of disputes).
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individual to work one of their claims one day in each sixty con-
secutive days, but in case of sickness or being prevented from
working said claim or claims by too much water, said claim or
claims shall not be liable to be jump'd provided the same may
be proved by at least one witness before the District Recorder[.]
Signed by John Parker, Hughes, E.E. Cheeny[,] Alexander
Elder, A.H. Otis[,] G.M. Sheridan[,] John Hughes, G.C. Jewell,
J.P. Stone[,] I. Slaght.
The foregoing laws of Rockwell Hill are a true copy of the
Original taken this 17th day of June 1852.
JOHN DAY District Recorder"'
All of these rules also appeared in the earliest codes, except that in
1849 claims were much smaller and the number of miners attending
the meetings was often much bigger.
A. Number of Claims
The second article in the Rockwell Hill code, providing that "no
person shall hold more than one claim by location," is almost
tautological, but not uncommon. If someone were able to make
multiple claims by location or preemption, then the maximum claim
size would be meaningless; two claims of 100 feet square, after all,
amount to the same thing as one claim of 100 by 200 feet. From
another point of view, one might say that all codes that set a maxi-
mum claim size limited miners to only one claim by location. Many
districts, however, recognized several different types of claims-such
as river claims, dry-digging claims, and hill claims. River claims took
the form of a short stretch of river bank, plus all the land on either
side running back as far as the miner wished; the holder would begin
work in the spring and move forwards towards the center of the
stream as it fell during the course of the summer. Dry diggings were
believed to have been the beds of old rivers; claims were square and
the dirt had to be carried to water for washing. Miners were
generally allowed to hold one of each and to work them according to
season, that is, river claims in the summer and dry diggings in the
rainy season.
The Rockwell Hill law sets no limit on the number of claims one
could hold by purchase, gift, or other means; and many other pub-
lished codes provided explicitly that "all persons can hold one claim
by occupancy and any number by purchase.""' 3 The property rights in
112. KING, supra note 50, at 337.
113. For later examples, see id. at 280 (Warren Hill, 1853); id. at 282 (Sucker Flat, 1855);
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claims thus included the freedom to buy, sell, and, in general, to
transfer rights, as one might expect in a system designed by Ameri-
cans. The potential abuses of such a law are discussed above;114 later
codes often also included provisions intended to prevent spurious
sales-for example, by requiring the seller to have worked the claim
for ten days and the buyer to pay genuine remuneration. 5
In many diggings, however, miners were not permitted to hold
more than one claim at a time, or sometimes two claims that
amounted to the same thing-such as one by preemption and one by
purchase, or one claim in the dry diggings and one along the river.16
Such restrictions on accumulation may well have been the norm in
the early days of the gold rush, since James Carson wrote in 1853
that at that time, the majority of camps allowed miners to hold any
number of claims by purchase, and he suggested that this was a
change from the rules of 1848 to 1850.1" Moreover, as we saw above,
the one-claim rule was the first of The Miner's Ten Commandments,
suggesting that even in 1853, when the Commandments were written,
this was considered customary.
A one-claim rule was a very stringent restriction on a miner's
interest in his claim. More than any other feature of the codes, it
reduced the miner's right to a personal use right. Where the claim
size was small, as it was in many of the diggings of 1849, and where
claims could be jumped if they had not been worked in three days or
a week, the effect was that a miner could hold only the area in which
he himself was actively digging. Capital could not be used to increase
profits, because it could not be invested in extra claims, at least not
until the first claim was worked out. The one-claim rule, while it
id. at 288 (Oro Fino, 1856); id. at 289 (Ohio Flat, 1856); id. at 291 (Little Humbug Creek, 1856);
id. at 292 (Maine Little Humbug Creek, 1856); id. at 300 (Brownsville, 1860); id. at 301 (Bodie,
1860). In addition, at least twenty-four codes passed between 1850 and 1853 in Nevada County
in and around Grass Valley permitted miners to hold multiple claims by purchase. Most, if not
all, of these concerned quartz diggings and are not relevant to our discussion; the Gold Moun-
tain Laws (1850) may be an exception. See id at 331; GUDDE, supra note 30, at 135-36.
114. See text accompanying supra notes 77-80, infra note 236.
115. See KING, supra note 50, at 296 (reprinting Centreville and Helltown Mining Laws,
Oct. 11, 1857).
116. For mostly later examples, see id. at 292 (Saint Louis Mining District, 1856); id at 277
(Upper Yuba Mining District, Apr. 11, 1852); id. at 277 (Weaver Creek, 1852); id. at 286
(Lower Humbug Creek, 1852); id. at 286 (Oregon Gulch, 1855); id. at 296 (Centreville and
Helltown, 1857); id. at 297 (Hungry Creek, Oct. 24, 1857). On January 27, 1858, the Hungry
Creek regulations were amended to allow multiple claims. See id. See also Irish Hill Mining
District Rules and Regulations, December 1857 (unpublished manuscript, Bancroft Library,
catalogued at Banc MSS C-B 547 Pt. 1: 112); Letter from J. Matthew to Euphemia (Feb. 17,
1851, Great Oak Flat, Tuolumne Co. (unpublished manuscript, Bancroft Library, catalogued at
Banc MSS C-B 547 Pt. I: 92); Hovey, Historical Account, supra note 71, at 3 (recording
Calaveras Resolutions, Dec. 9, 1848); Woods, supra note 77, at 127 (Jacksonville, Jan. 20,
1850).
117. Letter from James H. Carson, supra note 80, at 174-75.
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lasted, thus entrenched the preeminence of labor over capital, which
had been the most striking feature of the revolutions of 1848.
The rule also lowered the selling price of claims because claim-
holders in the same diggings, the largest part of the potential market,
could not buy a second claim. Thus, miners who enacted a "one-
claim" rule reduced the market value of their own claims (the use
value remained the same). That they realized this themselves is
suggested by the mining laws of the Upper Yuba Mining District,
which provided "that claims of deceased persons can be sold to the
highest bidder, and the person thus purchasing shall be allowed to
hold such claims for the purpose of Working, even if he is in pos-
session of others." ' I interpret this to mean that the claim was sold
for the benefit of the deceased's family back in the United States,
whose circumstances were often a source of concern to his friends,
and that in this particular case it was more important to raise the
largest possible amount than to adhere to the "one-claim" rule. In
other cases, however, the priorities were reversed.
B. Size of Claim
The third article of the Rockwell Hill law limits the size of a claim
to 100 feet square. By the standards of 1849, this was enormous; in
that year, claims were usually fifteen feet square or less in dry dig-
gings, and fifteen or twenty feet along the river.' 9
We do not know how the miners who drafted a local code decided
on the proper size for a claim, though the richness of the diggings
and the ease or difficulty of extracting gold were naturally taken into
consideration."' There were also at least two limiting conditions on
the minimum size. The first was the custom that had already
emerged before there was a miners' meeting. Perhaps when the
ground was already being worked in fifteen-foot-square parcels, it
would be excessively disruptive to cut the maximum claim size down
118. KING, supra note 50, at 277 (reprinting Article 4 of Yuba County Mining Laws, Apr.
11, 1852).
119. See, e.g., FRANK MARRYAT, MOUNTAINS AND MOLEHILLS 214 (London, Longman
1855) (giving ten feet for Murderer's Bar, April 1851); CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 1st Sess.
1362 (1850) (quoting Senator Fremont's statement that "[a]t this time, men on their rights only
stake out twenty feet square, and are satisfied with that"); Letter from Solomon A. Gorgas to
his wife (Sept. 9, 1850, Placerville) (unpublished manuscript, Huntington Library, catalogued
at HM 2187) (stating that each miner was allowed fifteen feet square); Woods, supra note 77,
at 57 (giving ten feet for Salmon Falls, July 9, 1849); id at 89-90 (giving fifteen feet for Aqua
Frio, Dec. 4, 1849).
120. See, e.g., John Sharp, Letter to the Editor, Settlers and Miners Convention,
CALIFORNIA CHRISTIAN ADVOCATE (San Francisco), Feb. 4, 1852 (stating that the miners and
settlers meeting in Spring Valley passed a resolution "[t]hat the extent of claims is properly
governed by their richness and accessibility-hence the inability to establish laws which shall
be applicable in all respects, to the different mining districts").
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to twelve feet square and to remeasure and redistribute all of the
claims. This may explain in part why rules allowing twenty feet and
even thirty feet claims were not challenged.
The second limitation is that claims had to be large enough to be
workable. Fifteen feet square is said to be "the quantity of ground
allowed to the man by custom" of the diggings in an account from
1851;121 another source from 1849 reports that ten feet square was
allowed by custom.1'2  A claim of ten feet square was hardly big
enough to contain both the hole and the pile of dirt that came out of
the hole-and one was not allowed to throw dirt on one's neighbor's
claim."2 At the phenomenally rich Mokelumne Hill, which was divid-
ed into claims of ten feet square, one miner would have to put off
digging until his neighbor had cleared his claim."' If claims had been
smaller, neighbors would have had to pool their claims and work
together-something they often did in practice, but which the codes
never forced them to do. Even in the richest diggings, claim sizes did
not fall below ten feet. Ten feet, then, was the minimum workable
size in the California mines.
Larger claims were sometimes open to challenge by outsiders,125
but rules allowing claims of twenty or thirty feet square were not
necessarily overturned, even in the most desirable diggings. In July
1850, for instance, on the forks of the Yuba River, an exceptionally
rich location was worked in claims of thirty feet square:
Every inch of ground is contested when there is any dispute as
to the true line or boundary + a great deal of litigation is going
on .... Each man can hold 30 feet square of ground. These are
121. Letter from George McKinley Murrell to Father (Jan. 29, 1851, Long Bar), in Murrell
Collection, supra note 47.
122. See Woods, supra note 77, at 57 (July 9, 1849, Salmon Falls, El Dorado County).
Woods was apparently working dry diggings.
123. See PIERRE CHARLES FOURNIER DE SAINT-AMANT, VOYAGES EN CALIFORNIE ET
DANS L'ORtGON PAR M. DE SAINT-AMANT ENVOYt DU GOUVERNEMENT FRANCAIS, EN
1851-1852, at 586 (Paris, Maison 1854). Saint-Amant says that holes were about two meters, or
over six and one half feet, in diameter. See id.
124. See Hovey, Journal, supra note 71, at 133 (describing Mokelumne Hill Incident,
March 1851). Shinn reported that in 1848 the ten-foot claims at Jackass Gulch "in many cases"
yielded ten-thousand dollars, but also that there were sufficient claims of that size for all the
miners in those diggings. SHINN, supra note 15, at 11. Since there were enough ten-foot claims
for all, there would be no pressure to reduce claim sizes even if that were a practical
alternative.
125. See, e.g., Letter from George McKinley Murrell to Robert F. Strange, supra note 81.
See also FARISS & SMITH, supra note 47, at 287 (stating that the first comers had staked out
very large size, but a miners meeting voted the size of claims down to forty feet). This account
was written in 1882, however.
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richer diggins than I have before been at-the largest amount
which I have heard being taken out of a single claim is 203 lbs. 126
Even where the claimless outnumbered the claimholders by twelve
to one, there was no demand for a redistribution of property.
27
Hiram Dwight Pierce, an elder of the Second Presbyterian Church,
observed the crowds pouring into Mariposa and remarked, "I never
wish to live amongst a more friendly peaceable law abiding
People.""
Local custom was a strong stabilizing factor in reaching a consen-
sus about claim size and other conditions of holding a mining claim.
When new diggings were discovered, many of the first miners on the
scene came from camps nearby, bringing with them the usages and
expectations of the spot where they had just been working. George
McKinley Murrell, one of the few active miners who thought the
mines should be sold to the miners rather than worked as claims,
wrote: "15 ft-the quantity of ground allowed to the man, by custom
& (that you know when acquiesced in for a long time becomes law)
is too small. ' 129 It was Murrell who had written the year before that
he and his partners had staked thirty-foot claims but feared that if
the diggings proved as rich as they hoped, "they will cut claims down
to 15 ft."'" As it happened, the new spot was not rich and the larger
claims were not cut down, but Murrell was ready to comply with such
a demand if it were made. Similarly, in the rush near Kelsey's
diggings described above,3 ' the first claims were staked at thirty feet
square, and this claim size was evidently ratified at the meeting held
two weeks later, even though there were not enough claims for all
the miners present at that size. If thirty feet was the maximum claim
size at Kelsey's, this would explain the automatic adoption of the
same size in the new diggings.
Contrary to Zerbe and Anderson's theory, maximizing total
wealth was not an important consideration when the first mining
126. Letter from Thomas J. Van Dorn to His Wife (July 28, 1850, Forks Yuba), in Thomas
J. Van Dorn Papers, 1847-1869 (unpublished manuscripts, Beinecke Library, catalogued at
WA MSS S-1319).
127. See Cowley, supra note 55, at 56 (Sept. 1, 1850, Mokalumne River) ("I... understand
that the northern mines has 12 men to one claim the mines being overrun with people.").
128. Letter from Hiram Dwight Pierce to His Wife and Family (Feb. 24, 1850, Mariposa)
(unpublished typescript, Huntington Library Mormon File, catalogued at microfilm 44).
Writing on March 24, 1850 to his wife, Pierce noted that "[t]he People are comeing [sic] into
this place in crowds. [T]he claims are all taken up. Each man is allowed 20 feet across the
aroyar [sic]." Id. Pierce was with a river-turning company at Mariposa, but intended to take up
a regular claim.
129. Murrell, supra note 121.
130. Murrell, supra note 81. See also text accompanying note 81.
131. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
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codes were passed. The only concession to this kind of efficiency in
1849 was that the claims were not made so small as to be unwork-
able; above that point, the productivity of a claim was unrelated to
its size. There were no economies of scale until 1850, when miners
began using the long tom, a dirt-washing device that required large
amounts of water. In fact, the claims of 1849 and 1850 were all
impractically small because they were worked out within a couple of
weeks, and then the claimholders had to prospect for a new spot, an
undertaking that could take days or even a week.'32 Any given
individual would have preferred to have a claim large enough to
provide him work for the whole season, and in this sense, fairness
trumped productivity. Furthermore, the miners used quick, wasteful
gold-washing methods, gathering the most easily obtained gold and
then moving on.'33
C Bending the Rules
I have suggested that ten or fifteen feet square, or fifteen feet
along the river, approached the minimum that could be worked
easily, and that local rules or customs setting claims at this size or a
bit larger were not challenged by outsiders. Where diggings were
exceptionally rich, however, miners bought and sold half-claims or
even smaller shares of a claim. For instance, in 1851, at Big Bar on
the North Fork of the American River, river claims were ten feet
wide; but five feet of ground sold for $300. In this case, the writer
specified that "five feet" were sold rather than a half-share of a ten-
foot claim to be worked in common.'" In other cases, the nature of
the interest in fractions of a claim is not clear. Certainly it was
possible for two or more men to buy a claim together and work it as
tenants in common. The Huntington Library has a "Bill of Sale" of
one-half of a claim on the Tuolumne, which may pertain to either a
divided or an undivided share.'35 This "deed" is especially interesting
because miners did not hold title to their claims. Perhaps the buyer
wanted extra security because the former owner was still working
132. See BROWNE, supra note 6, at 223 (stating that claims were small "so that everybody
should have a chance to get one," but that they were soon exhausted, and then the miners had
to move).
133. See id. ("If a claim could, by hastily [sic] washing, be made to pay $10 per day to the
hand for three months, or $6 for three years by a careful washing, the hasty washing was
preferred."). Browne thought that creating fee-simple in mining claims would have prevented
this waste, though it is not quite clear how a system of fee-simple would have worked.
134. Letter from George McKinley Murrell to His Father (May 21, 1851, Big Bar, El
Dorado County), in Murrell Collection, supra note 47.
135. D. Darius Comstock, Bill of Sale of One Half of His Share on the Tuolumne to John
F. Damon, Jacksonville, Sept. 11, 1850 (unpublished manuscript, Huntington Library, cata-
logued at HM 4326).
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there and, to all appearances, had the same interest in his claim as
before. In June 1850, Alexander Barrington paid $450 for a quarter
of a claim, possibly near Kiota Diggings, and $900 for the whole of a
claim on Little Deer. The high prices indicate that these were rich
diggings, and indeed Barrington took out extraordinary sums over
the course of the next few weeks. On July 1, he collected seventeen
ounces ($272.25) and on July 2, fifty-eight ounces (about $928). Two
months later, on September 27, Barrington refused an offer of $2,500
for his interest in the Kiota claim, which might well be the quarter-
share he bought earlier.136 There is, at any rate, clear evidence that
these were extraordinarily rich diggings, that even a portion of a
claim was expensive, and that the miners reacted by buying and
selling fractions of a claim rather than by reducing the legal claim
size.137
Barrington may have been working in a camp that had not placed
limits on the accumulation of claims, but one can imagine the same
sort of activity in camps with stricter rules. Only a pedant would
argue that the sale of quarter-shares violated the principle of one
claim per person, but other transactions, equally reasonable, did
begin to undercut the rule. This is especially clear when a seller
helped a buyer finance his purchase. Newcomers often arrived at rich
diggings without the money to buy a claim, and promised to pay the
seller from their earnings in one of various ways.38 This could be a
lump sum, but buyers might also promise the seller a share of the
future profits. Barrington sold his very rich claim at "Shirt-Tail Hill"
for two-thirds of the main lead profits (probably profits from the
lead he had opened) in October 1851. This was a good arrangement
for buyer and seller, inasmuch as they shared not only the risk that
the claim was almost worked out, but also the profits, which might be
enormous. It also gave Barrington a stake in a claim that he did not
own. Shirt-Tail Hill is otherwise undocumented, and miners there
may have been permitted to hold any number of claims, but at other
diggings this type of arrangement may have been used to circumvent
the rule of one claim per miner. A similar expedient involved renting
out a claim for a share of the profits;139 whatever form such an
136. See Alex[ander] R. Barrington, Journal with Brief Entries Concerning Voyage from
Panama to San Francisco,... the Northern Mines, and Return, March 23-Dec. 1L 1850, in
CALIFORNIA GOLD RUSH MISCELLANY, supra note 52, at 3, 5-7 (entry for Sept. 27, 1850).
137. See, e.g., From the Diggings- GoldRun, PLACER TIMES (Sacramento), May 17, 1850,
at 2 (recording sale of one-third of a one-hundred-foot claim for $5,000 at Gold Run, probably
in Nevada County).
138. We saw this already in one of the earliest documented claims, that of Peter Burnett at
Long's Bar in 1848. See BURNETT, supra note 43.
139. See, e.g., Simon Doyle, Journals and Letters 136 (unpublished manuscripts, Beinecke
Library, catalogued at WA MSS 144) (entry for Feb./Mar. 1851) ("1I... let my claim at Oregon
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arrangement took, it allowed a miner to profit from claims in several
diggings at once. All of these methods diffused title and muddied the
tidiness dictated by the code.
The almost universal practice of working in partnership also made
it difficult to tell who owned what. Placer mining was done most
efficiently by three or four men working together-one to dig, one to
carry dirt, one to work the mining "cradle," another to pour in
water."4 Partners shared all expenses, labor, and profits; they usually
lived together, took turns doing the cooking, and cared for one an-
other in sickness while the partnership lasted."' They held one claim
each and the codes explicitly or tacitly allowed their work on one
claim to hold them all' 2 -an arrangement that incidentally made it
difficult for neighbors to know whether an unworked claim was
abandoned or belonged to someone working on one of his part-
nership's other claims. Some groups took advantage of the confusion
and held claims for partners who were absent or wholly fictitious.143
Another blatant bending of the rules occurred when first arrivals
at rich diggings, knowing that rules would be passed to reduce the
maximum claims size, salvaged what they could from their holdings
by selling parts of them off to individual newcomers. l" Since it would
take some time to call a meeting and draft a code, some non-
claimholders preferred to guarantee themselves a spot in the richest
part of the diggings by buying one from the man in possession, rather
bar to Frank Owen, to work on the shares[,] and determined to remain in the mountains which
I did until the last of July.").
140. See, e.g., WIERZBICKI, supra note 24, at 44.
141. The solidarity of mining partners became proverbial. Charles Henry Randall
explained the arrangement in a letter to his parents dated San Francisco, September 13, 1849:
"We three have formed ourselves into a company for the purpose of digging gold[,] taking care
of each other if sick[,] with mutual interest in whatever any of us may obtain." Unpublished
manuscript, Bancroft Library, catalogued at Banc MSS 68 40 c.
142. See, e.g., KING, supra note 50, at 271-72 (reprinting Drytown Mining District, Ama-
dor County, Local Mining Laws, June 7, 1851, stating that "[i]n all cases where claims are held
by a company working jointly they shall not be required to work in more than one place but
when held by individuals each several claim must be worked").
143. See, e.g., ERNEST FRIGNET, LA CALIFORNIE 107 (Paris, Schlesinger Frires 2d ed.
1867) (stating that the public officer had no means of checking the names of miners listed as
members of a company, and that many companies included fictitious names). The miners of
Shaw's Flat passed a rule against such chicanery on August 5, 1854: "Art 5. But this law shall
not be considered as to allow a part of a company to hold the claims of the whole company
during the absence of a part of its members." HECKENDORN & WILSON, supra note 44, at 60-
61. This rule, though of a late date, is probably a response to abuses that emerged earlier.
144. See, e.g., E.A. Upton, Diaries, Sept. 8, 1849 to Sept. 26, 1850 (entry for Oct. 17, 1849)
(unpublished manuscript, Bancroft Library, catalogued at Banc MSS 78 48 c). Upton describes
a company of eighteen men who gave up on their attempt to turn the river, and who sold their
shares in the company since they were too few to hold their stretch of the bar as individual
river claims. In this case, the company also wanted extra members to "repel invasion"; compe-
tition over river-turning companies was more likely to turn violent than that over individual
claims. See also the remarks by Carson quoted in supra note 80.
41
McDowell: From Commons to Claims
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2002
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
than waiting to see if they could get one after the new claim size was
introduced. Similarly, one miner who was alone on a bar known only
to him arranged to sell neighboring claims; he made a deal to show
prospective buyers the spot only if they promised not to jump the
claims without paying him, as they had a right to do.' 5
D. Extra Claim for Discovery and the Free-Rider Problem
Many codes included a provision that the discoverer of new dig-
gings was entitled to two claims by location-a double share. It was a
meager reward for the successful prospector, who had invested his
time and talents in finding a new location that might quickly attract
hundreds of new miners. Where two men working together had
discovered a gold mine, they were entitled to only one extra claim
between them.'" Free-riding thus continued to be a problem:
There are plenty of "prospectors" in the mines, but the
profession scarcely pays, for the "prospector" is the jackal who
must search for many days, and, when he has found, the lion, in
the shape of the old miner, steps in and reaps the benefit. So
that there is something to be learnt in the diggings, for undoubt-
edly one of the first principles in life is to look on while others
work, and then step in and cry "halves.
1 4 7
In 1850 and later, we hear of hundreds of men sitting idle on their
claims or playing cards in the nearest town, just waiting for someone
else to hit pay-dirt. William Tell Parker wrote that in his neighbor-
hood, Dixon Creek on the Feather River, most people were not
working but waiting: "There are many stories of secret rich diggings
now afloat & hundred[s] of men are lying about watching others &
being watched themselves."" Similarly, William Reed wrote of
Kelsey's Diggings in September 1851, "Nobody around here making
anything good[;] many don't pretend to work but spend their time at
the bowling alley playing cards &c."' "9 They were waiting for some-
one to make a strike in the vicinity.
145. See Warren Sadler, Journal (entry for Apr. 27, 1850, near Deer Creek) (unpublished
manuscript, Bancroft Library, catalogued at Banc MSS C-F 73).
146. Reed, supra note 87 (entry for Oct. 1, 1851, Kelsey's Diggings) (stating that the dis-
coverer of new diggings was entitled to 90 feet, i.e., 30 feet each for him and his partner, "and
an extra claim for discovery").
147. MARRYAT, supra note 119, at 210-11.
148. William Tell Parker, Notes by the Way (Mar. 24, 1851, Dixon Creek on the Feather
River) (unpublished manuscript, Huntington Library, catalogued at HM 30873).
149. Reed, supra note 87 (entry for Sept. 26, 1851, Kelsey's Diggings). The applicable code
presumably included a work requirement; but these men were evidently confident that no one
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The worst kind of free-riding occurred when individuals held
claims in many different diggings, waited for gold to be discovered at
one of them, and then worked or sold the claim in question. This
kind of abuse was also prevented by work requirements that served
mainly to allow a miner to be away from his claim for a limited time
without losing it, and to allow others to jump a claim that was not in
active use. The Rockwell Hill code, reproduced above, provided that
claims must be registered with the Recorder within ten days of
location and must be worked at least one day in sixty, or were liable
to be jumped.
These bendings and evasions of the letter of the codes demonstrate
two points. First, they show that even where the rules prescribed a
simple, egalitarian property regime, the practical aspects of mining-
involving such matters as the advantages of partnerships, the high
value of some claims, and purchasers' inability to pay for their
claims-generated more complex forms of property-holding. Second,
it appears that the main enforcement mechanism of the codes-
namely, the right to jump a claim held in violation of the rules-
could not cope with these more complex relations to property. Thus,
even before the introduction of capital-intensive mining techniques,
the one-claim rule was under strain.
E. Notice Requirements
Every mining code specified the form of notice that was necessary
and sufficient to hold a claim. The customary law famously allowed
miners to secure their claims by leaving a pick or other tool in the
hole. "' The notice requirements of the codes varied considerably;
miners might have to post a notice bearing the name of each
claimant; to post notices bearing the signature of the claimant and
the date of the claim; to post notices at each end of the claim; to
mark the angles; to drive a two-foot long, three-and- a-half-inch wide
stake into the center of the claim; to drive a stake into each corner
and one in the middle bearing the number of the claim; and so on.''
Almost every code also required miners to record their claims with a
Recorder appointed for that purpose. In fact, however, few miners
150. See Letter from George Mifflin Harker to the St. Louis Weekly Reveille (Sept. 19,
1849, Weaverville, El Dorado County), reprinted in Morgan Street to Old Dry Diggings 1849,
6 GLIMPSES OF THE PAST 35, 66 (1939). See also BALLENSTEDT, supra note 46, at 51; 1
TAYLOR, supra note 46, at 101 (ch. 10, "Gallop to Stockton"). See also William Franklin
Denniston, Journal (entry for Nov. 25, 1849) (unpublished manuscript, Huntington Library,
catalogued at HM 50660) (writing in his journal the day after he arrived in the diggings that
leaving tools on one's claim "according to the mining laws conferred title").
151. For a list of different kinds of notice requirements (without references), see SHINN,
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took this last step, perhaps because claims were worked and aban-
doned so quickly, and because the Recorder charged a dollar.
The miners clearly attempted to devise some clear, conspicuous
form of notice that would indicate the boundaries of the claim and
the name of its holder. It was in every miner's interest to provide
notice of his claim, to discourage others from working it, and to
support his case if it was jumped and there was a dispute. But it was
in the newcomer's interest that notice be required, so that a claim
that was not clearly marked would be liable to be jumped. The
newcomer might otherwise find himself putting a day's work or more
into a spot that then turned out to belong to someone else. For
example, at Mormon Island in April 1850, a party of novices who
had been in the mines for only ten days found an old hole without
tools in it and began to dig. They dug all day, but at night the
"owner" came back and claimed it. The inadvertent jumpers sur-
rendered the claim, but kept the ten dollars they made that day
(whether by agreement or after arbitration remains unclear).52 When
they had a similar experience several days later, they were deter-
mined not to be bluffed off the claim; evidently they had learned that
absence of notice gave them the upper hand.
Just as outsiders were the greatest beneficiaries of these rules, so
they benefited most from publication, without which the miners in
possession could make whatever assertions they liked."3 Indeed,
"secret" rules are no rules at all; the group that monopolized these
diggings probably called its private arrangements "rules" simply in
order to give them a spurious legitimacy.
F Work Requirements
Almost all early mining codes required miners to work their claims
at least once in every five, seven, or ten days in order to retain them,
152. See Barker, supra note 91 (entry for Apr. 4, 1850, Mormon Island). For another
example of this sort of experience, see id. (entry for Dec. 6, 1850).
153. See, e.g., Woods, supra note 77, at 115 (stating that Woods and his party were ex-
pelled from several claims by local miners who had unpublished rules favoring themselves).
The Rough and Ready Company similarly attempted in 1849 to protect "their" ravine by
warning off any newcomers who tried to mine it; for an account preserved in later sources, see
UMBECK, supra note 9, at 91 (citing HARRY L. WELLS, HISTORY OF NEVADA COUNTY, CALI-
FORNIA 89 (Oakland, Thompson & West 1880); EDWIN BEAN, BEAN'S HISTORY AND DIREC-
TORY OF NEVADA COUNTY, CALIFORNIA 359 (Nevada, Cal., Daily Gazette Book & Job
Office 1867)). The Rough and Ready Company maintained its monopoly until challenged by
the Randolph Company. According to Wells in his 1880 Istory, "this proceeding threatened
to result in a difficulty between the two companies, but a compromise was effected" and they
divided the ravine between them. WELLS, supra, at 89. Bean does not mention the "difficulty";
he does report, however, that the companies kept their exclusive hold on the ravine through
the 1849 season, though they had lost it by the next season. BEAN, supra, at 359.
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unless the claimholder was sick or disabled."' I have found no refer-
ence, however, to a work requirement dictated by custom. Some
accounts suggest that a tool left on a claim would hold it forever,
implausible though this may be. McCall, a miner who had only just
arrived in the diggings, recorded a discussion with his partners in
October 1849 that suggested there was no work requirement, and
that simply clearing the topsoil from a claim served as notice:
A portion of the bar, above us for a considerable distance, had
been cleared of boulders and the top dirt by some diggers
before our arrival, and I suggested that as the operators had not
made an appearance since our advent, we work into the claim,
having the benefit of so much labor already expended, but my
soldier comrades said, "No. We have no right to the claim....
How do we know that they have abandoned it? They may be
sick or compelled to go some distance for provisions or tools,
intending to return. We have no right to the fruits of their
labor." They utterly refused to touch a shovelfull of dirt from
the claim.'55
This author paints a consistently rosy picture of life in the mines,
however, and he may well have misunderstood the force of good
manners in the diggings, which he calls rules of neighborliness, as op-
posed to "law."
A work requirement meant, in effect, that a miner had a right to
use the property he occupied at the moment-a right that Black-
stone hypothesized existed from the beginning of human society,
when mankind held all of the earth in common. Communal property
rights could extend only to the substance of things, he wrote, where-
as the use of a thing had to belong to the person using it at any given
time:
Thus the ground was held in common, and no part of it was the
permanent property of any man in particular; yet whoever was
in the occupation of any determined spot of it, for rest, for
shade, or the like, acquired for the time a sort of ownership
from which it would have been unjust, and contrary to the law of
nature, to have driven him by force: but the instant that he
154. See, e.g., KING, supra note 50, at 277 (Apr. 11, 1852, Upper Yuba Mining Laws)
(requiring that a claim be worked every five days); id (June 19, 1852, Weaver Creek Rules and
Regulations) (requiring that a claim be worked every ten days); id. at 280 (Oct. 22, 1853,
Warren Hill Act) (requiring claimholders to have persons at work on their claims "at all
times... [and] in good faith, not merely as a pretext to hold said claims"); id. (Nov. 12, 1854,
French Creek Mining Laws) (requiring that a claim be worked every seven days); id. at 283
(Smith's Flat Hill Laws) (requiring that a claim be worked every seven days).
155. ANSEL JAMES MCCALL, PICK AND PAN: TRIP TO THE DIGGING'S IN 1849, at 19 (Bath,
NY, Steuben Courier Printing 1883) (Oct. 9, 1849, Yuba River).
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quitted the use or occupation of it, another might seize it,
without injustice. "6
As Blackstone goes on to observe, disagreements might well arise
about who was the first to occupy a spot, and he could have added
that the concepts of "use" and "occupation" are indeterminate. How
much of a spot could one person occupy for shade? If there was not
enough shade for all, why should he not be made to share his spot?
Blackstone used "occupation" literally to mean actual presence,
which ceased "the instant that [one] quitted possession." It goes
against nature to grant only such ephemeral rights, he notes, when
even wild animals have nests and caverns that they regard as their
own and that they would defend unto death. Blackstone believed
that these uncertainties, together with the need to protect an
individual's investment in his home, prompted the introduction of
property rights.157
The main purpose of the mining codes, however, was to define the
limits of use and occupation precisely enough to manage without
rights in the substance of the mineral lands. A miner was said to be
using his claim if he worked it regularly; he did not forfeit his rights if
he left the claim unattended for two or three days, while he went to
collect his mail or to obtain provisions, but at a given point he was no
longer actively exploiting the claim, and his interest lapsed. Similarly,
the question of how much ground one man could be said to "occupy"
was set originally at roughly the minimum amount that he could
work practically. To a certain extent, therefore, the miners formal-
ized and stabilized the communion of goods as Blackstone imagined
it.
G. The Nature of the Property Interest in Mining Claims
In formal terms, the federal government continued to have fee-
simple in the mineral lands and their gold; it had tacitly accepted the
miners' pretensions, but could at any time have expelled the present
occupants and sold the mineral territory to others. The mining codes
established the conditions under which a miner would have the
exclusive use of a parcel of land for mining purposes. This property
right could be sold, given away, or left as a legacy, and the claim-
holder could prosecute trespassers with a reasonable certainty that
the community would enforce his rights. The property right was in
minerals only and not in the surface soil. From the opposite point of
view, farmers, homeowners, and even towns in the mining district did
156. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *3.
157. Id. at *4-*9.
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not have a claim to the minerals under their land unless they fulfilled
the requirements of the local mining code."8
Did this amount to perfect title regarding all parties except for the
federal government?' 9 No. Most obviously, as noted above, the min-
ing codes severely restricted the miner's property right in his claim.
Later miners' meetings could change the code, and thus could
change the claimholder's property rights, for instance by reducing
the maximum claim size or imposing further work requirements or
notice requirements. 16° On the other hand, as the miners appreciated
later, a mining claim could not be attached by creditors or taxed by
the state. In fact, it could be argued that a mining claim was not
property at all. As late as 1865, a litigant before the U.S. Supreme
Court argued that a Nevada mining claim could not be assigned a
value and therefore could not have the value of $1,000 required to
give the Supreme Court jurisdiction in the case. The claimholder's
interest, counsel argued, was at best a tenancy at will of the govern-
ment. "Whatever the occupant may hope for or even expect... he
has neither right, title, interest, claim, nor demand in or to the
property in suit.' 16' The Court was not persuaded by this argument.
A Nevada statute had recognized the miners' codes and customs as
valid and binding, and the federal government had sanctioned them
by implication. Moreover, it was plain that Nevada mines were
generating millions of dollars. 62
In sum, the maximum claim size (which in 1849 was near the
minimum practicable size), along with the notice and work require-
ments, limited the claimholder's right in his property in favor of
others who might want to jump his claim. As we have seen, however,
the most notable feature of the codes is that many did not permit
158. Several codes required miners to pay the owner of the land for damage to his crops
and improvements and to repair city streets when they had finished mining them. See, e.g.,
HECKENDORN & WILSON, supra note 44, at 54-55 (reprinting the code of Jamestown, 1853); id.
at 72 (reprinting the code of Gold Springs, Aug. 19, 1854); SHINN, supra note 15, at 15-16, 24-
25 (discussing codes with such provisions).
159. Compare the following description of a river-turning company's right in the riverbed
it exposed: "It remains to add a remark as to the title. This is as perfect as it can be under the
present state of things, or until the government shall confirm it. It is possessory only, but
cannot be disturbed or disputed, except by the government. In a word it is perfect, as regards
all other parties." PHILO D. MICKLES & JA[ME]S DELAVAN, ROCKY-BAR MINING COMPANY,
CIRCULAR, ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION, RESOLUTIONS, ETC. (New York, The Company
1850) (copies of this printed circular are in the Bancroft, Beinecke, and Huntington Libraries).
Seeking to encourage investors, this circular would naturally stress the security of the
company's right in the riverbed.
160. See BROWNE, supra note 6, at 228 ("A miners' meeting adopts a code; it apparently is
the law. Some time after, on a few day's notice, a corporal's guard assembles, and, on a simple
motion, radically changes the whole system by which claims may be held in a district.").
161. Sparrow v. Strong, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 97, 101 (1865) (argument of counsel).
162. Seeid. at 104.
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miners to hold more than one claim at a time. In the early years,
which are poorly documented, this rule appears often but is by no
means universal. Deciding whether to allow individuals to accumu-
late claims by purchase if they were willing and able, or to prevent
such aggrandizement, was one of the most significant choices that the
first miners' meeting had to make. Consider the arguments against
such a rule. The market for claims would almost certainly be
affected, because some of the wealthiest potential buyers-those
whose own claims turned out to be rich-were forbidden to buy, and
this is quite likely to have reduced the selling price. On the other
hand, a miner who struck it rich could not invest his new money in
more claims; his opportunities were limited. To prevent a willing
buyer and a willing seller from making a deal in this way seems
almost un-American. And finally, the opportunities for wage-earners
would be affected. If every claim was fifteen feet square, the owner
would be less likely to employ workers, even if he had the means; by
contrast, holders of large claims could offer steady employment to
several workers. Therefore, the purpose of the codes was in part to
protect the property rights of those who held claims, but the actual
terms of the codes limited those rights and guaranteed outsiders or
non-claimholders a reasonable chance of entry.
V. WHY DID THE CODES RESTRICT PROPERTY RIGHTS?
The remainder of this Article will address the question of why the
mining codes restricted property rights so severely, even when they
were enacted by miners, most of whom held or expected to hold a
claim. In this section, I will first discuss the ideological debate about
property rights in the gold mines, and will demonstrate that the
egalitarian, anti-capitalist norm of the miners was by no means self-
evident or undisputed among Americans of the day. I will then turn
to questions of self-interest. As indicated above, I will argue that the
miners associated fee-simple in land with monopoly and the
separation of capital and labor. They feared monopolization of the
diggings not just in the long run, but immediately. Because miners
generally abandoned their claims in two to three weeks, even those
who held a claim when the mining code was enacted might soon be
both claimless and penniless. Knowing this, they voted for rules that
restricted all property rights, including their own, so as to increase
their chances of getting another claim in the future.
A. Ideology
I suggest that new norms of fairness arose in the diggings. The
expectations about property rights were not those brought from
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home, but those generated by local experience. New arrivals in Cali-
fornia looked around, saw what the local rules were, and adopted
them without criticism. The miners in the diggings where claims were
first introduced were probably motivated by a rough idea that every-
one should have a share, but the customs they developed became
associated with an ideology that fee-simple in mineral land was
wrong. That ideology was articulated and further developed to de-
fend the mining custom against challenges from those who believed
that miners should hold title to their claims.
That there was a debate about the appropriate nature of property
rights is evident from the fact that some diggings limited the number
of claims one could hold and others did not. One possible explana-
tion for the one-claim rule is that it was a concession to non-
claimholders, and was the price of having any property rights at all;
this view assumes that the outsiders might have refused to recognize
the law if they were locked out of the diggings by a rule that allowed
first-comers to own large numbers of claims. There is no evidence for
such reasoning in any of our sources, however, nor do we have
reason to believe that diggings where miners outnumbered claims
were more likely to pass a one-claim rule. The sources, in fact,
include hardly any arguments made by newcomers challenging
existing arrangements, and there are no records of the debates at the
meetings where the rules and regulations were enacted. Without
such accounts, we cannot know for certain what was in the minds of
those who supported or opposed various restrictions on property
rights. At most, the miners recorded in their journals that someone
had too much or that others thought they themselves had too much,
but not why they believed there should or should not be certain
limits on property-holding.163 It may be that after the first few mining
codes had been enacted, there was a shared local norm of acceptable
claim sizes, and a generally accepted argument for limiting property
rights, that nobody needed to invoke explicitly."6
163. There were at least two groups of miners who prepared to resist outsiders who
claimed they had too much, but both of these were river-turning companies. Because such
companies were everywhere entitled to as much of the riverbed as they exposed, they were
only standing up for their rights. One of the writers was also a Texan, and Texans were
particularly prone to fighting; the other was from Louisiana. See C.C. Mobley, Book [Diary of
a Miner at Oregon Bar, California... 1850-18511 at 72 (July 10, 1850) (unpublished manu-
script, Huntington Library, catalogued at HM 26612) ("We learn that some stragglers are
threat[e]ning to take from us a part of our Claim under the plea that we have too much. Let
them come."). See also Letter from Ja[me]s McMurphy (Mar. 15, 1850) (unpublished manu-
script, Huntington Library, catalogued at HM 53735) ("[A]t Sacramento there is a grate huin
cry about our claming so much of both rivers, for one I should like to know what they are goin
to do about it .... ).
164. See supra notes 129-131 and accompanying text.
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In the press, however, and in the California legislature and the
Congress, the best disposition of claims in the gold mines was hotly
debated.165 We have seen that the miners rejoiced in their hopes of a
new social order based on gold mining, while others believed that
California would make no real progress until the placers were
exhausted. Similarly, some legislators strongly opposed proposals
that would create a fee-simple in mining claims, while others favored
sales or leases. In the course of the debates in 1849 and 1850, the
miners' representatives made arguments for limited property rights.
These sentiments are echoed in some of the miners' own writings of
the early 1850s, the principle tenets of which were equal access and
opportunity (which did not mean equality of wealth), and blocking
the emergence of monopolies. These arguments, and those made in
the press, are the best evidence available for the convictions of the
assemblies that passed the early mining codes. At the same time, the
repeated proposals to give or sell to the miners a fee-simple interest
in their claims, beginning in 1849 and continuing through the early
1850s, demonstrate that a regime of limited property rights in mining
claims was not considered the only possible option. Those in favor of
selling or leasing the mines argued in terms of greater prosperity
overall, and social and commercial progress (permanent communi-
ties, division of labor, investment in infrastructure, etc.).
The federal government had two concerns: it not only wanted to
promote the interests of the Californians, but also hoped to generate
some revenue from the gold mines which, its spokesmen said, had
been acquired at such a cost to the nation. (In fact, of course, the
price had been paid before the mines were discovered.) For this
reason, and because of the tradition of selling public lands to
individuals, Presidents Polk (1845-49) and Taylor (1849-50) recom-
mended that the mineral lands be divided into small parcels and
leased or sold.1" A bill was introduced in the U.S. Senate on January
3, 1849, proposing the sale of mineral lands in California in lots not
less than two acres each and at a minimum of $1.25 per acre.167
Thomas Hart Benton spoke out strongly against the bill, however,
165. The various suggestions at the federal and state level about how to administer the
mineral lands (which belonged to the federal government and not to California, even after the
latter came into being), have been summarized conveniently by Joseph Ellison. JOSEPH ELLI-
SON, CALIFORNIA AND THE NATION, 1850-1869, at 54-63 (1927); Joseph Ellison, The Mineral
Land Question in California, 1848-1866, in THE PUBLIC LANDS 71 (Vernon Rosco Carstensen
ed., 1963).
166. See ELLISON, supra note 165, at 55-56. See also CALIFORNIA AND NEW MEXICO,
supra note 4, at 532-33 (printing letter from Governor Mason suggesting that gold bearing
lands should be leased in lots of approximately 100 square yards, at $100 to $1000 annually, or
sold at public auction in larger plots).
167. CONG. GLOBE, 30th Cong., 2d Sess. 257 (1849).
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arguing that fee-simple in mining claims would lead to concentration
of claims in the hands of a few, and could not be implemented in any
case. Since the gold was distributed irregularly, he argued, mining
was more like hunting than like agriculture or any other steady
industry. "For this purpose, it is not fee-simples in two acres that are
wanted, but permits to hunt, and protection in the discovery when a
deposit is found."'"
In September 1850, Senator John C. Fremont of California pro-
posed an arrangement similar to Benton's, whereby miners could
take out permits to dig for one dollar per month. The other terms of
the proposed bill were strikingly similar to the codes drafted by the
miners themselves, including the one-claim-per-person rule.69 The
bill passed the Senate, but the term ended before it could be read in
the House. By the time of the next Congress, it had become known
that the miners had adopted their own rules and required no help
from Washington.17 °
The California legislature was as divided as Congress over the is-
sue, and thus could not agree about what recommendation to send to
Washington regarding the mines. At the constitutional convention of
October 1849, a resolution against the sale of mineral lands lost by a
vote of sixteen to twenty-one; the minority included most of the
delegates from the mining districts. 7 '
The Select Committee of the California legislature "to whom was
referred the Joint Resolutions on the subject of the Public Domain,
Mineral Lands, Custom Houses, and Branch of the United States
Mint, and Money that rightfully belongs to the State of California,"
submitted two separate reports on February 9, 1850. The majority
report recommended a policy of granting leases or permits for
working small tracts to American citizens and prospective American
citizens only. The majority preferred leases to sales or grants of title,
because a market in property would open the door to monopoly.
They argued that monopoly would be bad for labor and for the com-
168. Id.
169. See CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 1st Sess. 1370 (giving Sen. Fremont's summary of the
provisions of the bill, during the debate on the California mines on September 25, 1850).
Thomas Butler King similarly opposed sale. See KING, supra note 2, 28-29 (arguing that
capitalists would monopolize the gold mines and that the miners now in the diggings would
resist such sales).
170. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3226 (1866) (giving Sen. Stewart's remarks
on the history of Fremont's bill, introduced in September 1850).
171. See J. Ross BROWNE, REPORT ON THE DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION OF CALIFOR-
NIA ON THE FORMATION OF THE STATE CONSTTUTION IN SEPTEMBER AND OCrOBER, 1849,
at 472 (Washington, D.C., J.T. Towers 1850). At this same convention, delegates resisted the
introduction of limited liability corporations and banks into California as "legalizing the associ-
ation of capital to war upon labor." BROWNE, supra note 6, at 117 (quoting William Gwin, a
delegate from San Francisco).
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munity, because monopolists would seek out cheap labor, without
considering the character of their workforce.'" If Congress decided
to sell the mineral lands, however, the majority recommended that
the tracts should be small and that the purchasers should be allowed
to pay for them in installments over eight to ten years, so that even
poor laborers would be able to buy.
The minority report of the committee objected to leasing or selling
mineral lands. Either system, the minority argued, would result in a
monopoly of all the valuable placers in the hands of a few claim-
holders "whose interests would thereby become immediately adverse
to those of the masses, that from necessity are compelled to labor.""'
The minority said that the "monopoly" could take the form of a
combination of the holders in fee, who would naturally strive to
reduce wages to the lowest possible figure. Like the majority, the mi-
nority report uses the language of republicanism: "[T]he true policy
of the Government is that which tends to secure to every citizen a
competency; and the best wealth that a nation can boast of, is that
every citizen has a comfortable home that he can claim his own.'
74
In the end, the California legislature did not pass any laws intended
to supersede the laws and customs of the miners. Those camps that
preferred not to recognize titles to individual claims continued as
they were.17
The strongest arguments in favor of fee-simple in mineral lands
were made in two letters to the Sonora Herald published on October
23 and 30, 1852.176 The writer signed himself "Tuolumne" and
claimed to speak for the "intelligent, practical miners," whose voci-
ferous complaints about the existing property regime had been
ignored.177 It is difficult to know what to make of these pseudony-
mous letters, because we can only guess who these "practical" miners
were and how many they were. "Tuolumne's" ideas have much in
common with civic republicanism, so it is unlikely that he repre-
sented the entrepreneurs who hoped to engage in large-scale, more
172. California Legislative Assembly, Journal of the Assembly, 1st Sess. 805-06 (1849-50).
173. dat806,811.
174. Id. at 812.
175. The State of California took a hands-off approach. See, e.g., People v. Naglee, 1 Cal.
232, 244-45 (1850) ("[T]he State is not the stewart or security, nor bailiff of the General
Government, having in charge the protection of the public property.").
176. See "Tuolumne," A Title to the Land: The Present Tenure, SONORA HERALD, Oct.
23, 1852, at 1 [hereinafter, "Tuolumne," The Present Tenure]; and "Tuolumne," A Title to the
Land: The Present System-its Unthiftiness, SONORA HERALD, Oct. 30, 1852, at 1
[hereinafter "Tuolumne," The Present System]. Rodman Paul notes that the editors of the
Sonora Herald were among the chief proponents of selling titles to mining claims. See PAUL,
supra note 1, at 228 n.44.
177. "Tuolumne," The Present Tenure, supra note 176, at 1.
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productive mining. The letters also appeared in the Sonora Herald a
full two years after the period that this article covers; at that point,
conditions in the mines had changed significantly. In any case,
"Tuolumne's" concerns focus on the inefficiency, instability, and
uncertainty arising from insecurity of title, all of which would have
troubled early nineteenth-century authorities on property law and
economic progress. First, he argues that the conditions set on holding
a claim, such as the notice requirement and the work requirement,
practically invited litigation because they were fuzzy.'78 Stakes and
notice boards could be knocked down or moved, and work require-
ments, which often applied only when water was available, generated
disputes over what constituted "work" and when water was "avail-
able." These difficulties were compounded by the lack of written law
beyond the barebones of the code, which obliged juries to reinvent
the wheel for every case.179 Fee-simple, "Tuolumne" implies, would
supply a bright-line rule that would avert many of the interminable
lawsuits then plaguing the mines.
Second, "Tuolumne" claims that because their titles were insecure,
miners were more concerned with rapid profits than with long-term
productivity. Each miner worked his claim blindly and hastily, some-
times overlooking rich deposits, and dumping his dirt and stones on
what he supposed to be unproductive ground. The next wave of
miners then washed the same dirt or shifted the first party's tailings
to get at the remunerative ground beneath."
Finally, and at greatest length, "Tuolumne" argued that the miners
were constrained to remain on their claims, keeping up a pretense of
regular work even when there was not enough water to mine effec-
tively. Because they were thus tied down, they could not engage in
other, more gainful employment. He said that at Shaw's Flat and
Columbia, for instance, the profitability of the claims was certain,
although title was not. Hundreds of miners sat on their claims for
months, warding off interlopers instead of engaging in gainful em-
ployment elsewhere, or joining a company to bring the water to the
district that would bring the long toms into action. 8' On the other
hand, because the miners had no permanent stake in their diggings,
"Tuolumne" wrote, they were reckless and restless, and failed to
invest in their communities. He proposed that all mining claims
should be surveyed and recorded, and that claimholders should be
178. Id.
179. Id
180. "Tuolumne," The Present System, supra note 176, at 1. See also BROWNE, supra note
171.
181. "Tuolumne," The Present System, supra note 176, at 1. For explanation of the long
tom, see supra text accompanying note 132.
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issued a certificate granting them perfect title so long as they
complied with certain uniform and well established requirements."
The problems that "Tuolumne" identified were real-especially, as
we have seen, the problem that hundreds of miners sat idle near
their claims waiting for them to become workable.183 Whether it was
feasible to survey the diggings at the beginning of each new rush or
to administer a title-based system, let alone enforce it, is less clear.
At the least, however, "Tuolumne" articulated the very real diffi-
culties of a property regime without fee-simple.
As we have seen, those who were in California in 1848 thought
they were witnessing the birth of a new order in which the individual
laborer held all the power and capital was powerless, and most of
them thought this was a good thing. Henry George would oppose
private ownership of land three decades later.' The few miners of
the early 1850s who wrote about the advantages of limited property
rights hoped to secure for labor the advances it had made in 1848.
Like their representatives in Congress and in the California legisla-
ture, whose speeches they may have read, these miners believed that
outright ownership of gold-mining claims would enable speculators
to monopolize the good diggings and to subordinate the laborer to
capital.'85 In the fall of 1852, a meeting of miners and settlers in
Spring Valley passed a resolution urging the mining community "not
to sanction the making of any new claims by men who already have
enough," lest a mining aristocracy arise among them. '86 James Carson
wrote in 1852 that "one claim after another would be purchased until
whole districts would be under the control of the money gods.' 1 87 He
observed that in diggings where it was possible to sell mining claims,
newcomers had no chance for a share, and had to hire out for what
they could get. If the tenure laws were passed, Carson said, the
current miners would be reduced to hired hands within six months,
and their salaries would be reduced to a pittance. Private property
rights would lead inevitably to monopoly, as rich investors would
buy out individual miners until there were no more miners who
worked their own claims. The miners worried not only that they
182. "Tuolumne," The Present Tenure, supra note 176, at 1.
183. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
185. See, e.g., Carter, supra note 24 (entry describing speeches on July 4, 1849, Coloma).
The speakers differed on the questions of slavery in California and foreigners in the mines, but
"both were opposed to monopolies of all kinds, particularly of land." Carter, however, thought
there was little chance of monopoly.
186. Sharp, supra note 120. I owe this reference to GOODMAN, supra note 23, at 55-56,
who notes that the miners at the convention envisaged a republican society of equals in the
mines, without the speculation and profiteering of the world outside.
187. CASTRO, supra note 22, at 175.
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would no longer be able to play in the lottery, but also that when
capital got the upper hand, they would not even get the full value of
their labor-the value of labor being particularly easy to calculate in
the mines."
Limited property interests protected the spirit of freedom and
equality in 1848, when "labour ha[d] obtained the upper hand of
capital."' 9 For example, Pierre de Saint-Amant, a Frenchman writing
about the mines in 1854, explained how agglomerations of capital
were shackled by the rule that only an individual's labor created a
property right in his claim. A company could only acquire mineral
land for its machinery by holding the land in the name of the
employees, who, if the site proved rich, would not be satisfied with
their simple salaries. It was the absence of secure title alone, Saint-
Amant wrote, that postponed the time when big money would
consume the little man."9 Those who had capital to invest, of course,
saw the restrictions on accumulation as impediments to progress.
The labor theory of value-or the miners' belief that capital could
not "earn" money-is illustrated by their attitude towards those who
helped finance their trips to California. For many, the trip to the gold
mines was a joint venture with a person or persons back home.
Those who stayed home supplied the capital for the expedition,
while the forty-niner contributed his labor, and in a year's time they
would divide the profits.' When the miners reached the mines,
however, and understood how grueling the work was, how miserable
the life, and how great the risk of disease and death, they one and all
concluded that the "bargain" was unconscionable. In their view, the
laborer-i.e., the gold-miner-had created all of the profits while the
188. See id. at 176. Compare the words from final resolutions of the convention of the
National Trades' Union movement of the Workers' Party in 1834:
[T]he social, civil, and intellectual condition of the laboring classes of these United
States... exhibit the most unequal and unjustifiable distribution of the produce of labor,
thus operating to produce a humiliating, servile dependency, incompatible with the
inherent natural equality of man.
6 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 205 (John R. Commons &
Helen L. Sumner eds., 1910). In another resolution, the delegates condemned the sale of the
public lands, because this would effectively debar the laboring classes from such land for lack
of capital. Id. at 207-08.
189. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
190. See SAINT-AMANT, supra note 123, at 562-64.
191. See, e.g., HENRY SARGENT CRANDALL, LOVE AND NUGGETS 19 (Roland D.
Crandall ed., 1969) (entry for Jan. 15, 1849); WILLIAM THURSTON, GUIDE TO THE GOLD
REGIONS OF UPPER CALIFORNIA 63 (London, Darling 1849) (quoting "a New York cor-
respondent of one of the chief daily journals"); James W. Haines, Life and Experiences in
California 12 (unpublished typescript, Bancroft Library, catalogued at Banc MSS C-D 323)
(notes written in 1887 for the use of H.H. Bancroft) (stating that farmers in Kingsville,
Vermont, furnished funds for prospective miners in return for half their earnings in the two
years after their arrival in California).
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investor did nothing. Prentice Mulford surmised that none of them
actually divided their earnings when they got back,'" although at
least some miners did return the money that the other advanced.'93
According to the Sacramento Placer Times of May 3, 1850, the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court ruled that an alleged silent partner in a
gold-digging arrangement had no right to the $20,000 worth of gold
dust dug up by his partner, the miner. The Court refused to enjoin
the miner from collecting the whole amount from the U.S. Mint,
where it had been deposited, and said that "even if there was a
partnership, the plaintiff not having labored towards that end, and
the whole fund having been acquired by the defendant, it was not a
partnership properly.'
194
The miners wanted to prevent a few individuals from monopoliz-
ing the mineral lands and reducing the rest of the population to wage
laborers. In this sense, one might call the miners anti-capitalist. At
the same time, however, they had all invested huge sums to get to
California for the sole purpose of collecting as much gold as they
possibly could, whether by mining or by "speculation" -that is,
trade, money-lending, or buying and selling claims where this was
permitted. 95 These two priorities were not seen as conflicting."9
James Collier, the newly arrived Collector of Customs, wrote on
November 13, 1849 that California's position was "peculiar" because
here, labor controlled capital. "The mechanic and artisan fixes his
own price, and the capitalist is compelled from necessity to submit to
192. See PRENTICE MULFORD, PRENTICE MULFORD'S STORY: OR, LIFE BY LAND AND
SEA, A PERSONAL NARRATIVE 8 (New York, F.J. Needham 1889).
193. See, e.g., Letter from Charles Rossiter Hoppin (June 6, 1850, Goodyear's Bar, Sierra
County), in CHARLES ROSS1TER HOPPIN, SOME OF HIS LETTERS HOME 1849-1863 AS
WRITTEN TO HIS FAMILY IN NILES, MICHIGAN, FOLLOWING HIS IMMIGRATION TO CALI-
FORNIA IN 1849, at 6-7 (1948) (stating that he considered the contract with his backers null and
void: "I now think of paying him for my fit out across the plains and that is all I shall do"). See
also Letter from Albion C. Sweetser (Aug. 25, 1850, North Fork American River) (unpub-
lished manuscript, Huntington Library, catalogued at HM 4172) (stating that the outfitter had
provided $500 for one year's expenses and felt he had been cheated when his mining partner
sent back only $600).
194. California Gold Diggers-Important Decision, PLACER TIMES (Sacramento), May 3,
1850, at 4. This case is not included in the Pennsylvania reporters of the time.
195. See, e.g., Letter from William A. Brown to his father (July 25, 1850, Stockton) (un-
published manuscript, Huntington Library, catalogued at HM 26407-26462) (using the term
"speculating" to describe joining a trading establishment); Henry Sturdivant, Journal from
Dec. 8th. [18149, at 30 (unpublished manuscript, Huntington Library, catalogued at HM 261)
(entry for June 11, 1850, Kanaka Diggings, El Dorado County) (stating that Sturdivant is
afraid he will miss "all good chances for speculation"); Reed, supra note 87 (entry for Nov. 23,
1851) (using the phrase "a speculative turn" to describe buying claims on credit).
196. In New England, too, faith in equal opportunity persisted in a world of capital and
labor. See J.R. POLE, THE PURSUIT OF EQUALITY IN AMERICAN HISTORY 152 (2d ed. 1993)
(elaborating this point and quoting a "prominent Massachusetts speaker" as saying that "the
laborer of today is the capitalist of tomorrow").
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that price, whatever it may be," he wrote. At the same time, he said,
California "now is, and for all time to come must be, essentially
commercial. There is gold in California. She is rich in mineral wealth:
that is a 'fixed fact."' 197
The miners were both entrepreneurs and egalitarians, to whom
equality meant, above all, equal opportunity.98 They did not regard
pre-existing wealth as a legitimate source of property in mineral
land. Some believed enthusiastically that the conditions in the gold
mines neutralized the artificial inequalities that arise in a complex
society. One described California as "the most democratic country"
in the world."9 "Working side by side in all these gulches are the sons
of toil and those reared in the lap of ease .... Here the wielder of the
pick is as proud as a lord, and bends the knee to no man. ' ' "m If
anyone had an advantage, it was those who had previously been at
the bottom of the social ladder, namely the manual laborers."1
Many of the miners had come to California specifically to liberate
themselves from the control of those with money, by collecting
enough gold to set up in business for themselves or by paying off the
mortgage on the family farm. The anti-speculator, anti-capital senti-
ment in the mines was therefore strong. On being asked why he had
come to California, one gold-seeker answered, "I find that in this
world the standard by which men are estimated is wealth, and only
wealth."2' Before arriving at the mines, he said, "I used to pass men
who would bend upon me such looks of patronizing tolerance...
simply because their fathers were rich or had bestowed upon them
the fruits of their ill-gotten gains, only because I was clad in a
laborer's garb or engaged in honest labor."2 3 Similarly, a miner in
1851 reported that thousands of Americans had come to the mines to
"extricate themselves from the iron grasp of land sharks, that are
scattered throughout the length and breadth of our country.
2
'
197. Letter from James Collier to W.M. Meredith, Secretary of the Treasury (Nov. 29,
1849), in CALIFORNIA AND NEW MEXICO, supra note 3, at 30-31.
198. On early nineteenth-century movements aimed at equality of economic opportunity,
including Skidmore's view that the state should bring about equality of property by collecting
all existing property and redistributing it, see POLE, supra note 196, at 165-68.
199. 2 TAYLOR, supra note 46, at 68 (ch. 30, "Society in California").
200. MCCALL, supra note 155, at 17 (Oct. 6, 1849, Yuba River). See also Letter from Allen
Varner to Elias Varner (Nov. 12, 1849, Rector's Bar, Placer County), in Varner, supra note 95
(stating that those who wanted to make money in the mines had to work hard and live rough,
"[flor there is no Aristocracy to contend with here").
201. See SAINT-AMANT, supra note 123, at 582-83.
202. MCCALL, supra note 155, at 25-26 (Oct. 26, 1849).
203. Id. at 26.
204. JOHN HALE, CALIFORNIA AS IT IS: BEING A DESCRIPTION OF A TOUR BY THE OVER-
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The miners had solid grounds for mistrusting private property
rights. While they were passing their codes in the foothills, other
immigrants were trying to settle on California's arable land. Much of
that land was claimed by native Californians or their successors in
interest. The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo (signed February 2, 1848)
provided that all Mexican-owned property in territories ceded to the
United States would be respected.' Years of litigation followed over
the validity of individual titles to the enormous Mexican ranches.
During that time many settlers, or squatters, were uncertain whether
the land they occupied was available for preemption or was already
taken. The miners saw what happened to squatters in Sacramento
and San Francisco, and knew what would happen to them if title
came to the mining camps: with title would come lawyers, and with
lawyers would come the protection of one class of claims against
another.
The values of egalitarianism and opposition to capital played an
important part in shaping the law and then sustaining it. They are the
only justifications that the miners themselves gave for their peculiar
system of property law, and this is reason enough to take them
seriously. Moreover, as Zerbe and Anderson point out, the willing-
ness of outsiders to respect local mining rules as they found them,
and of claimholders to come to one another's assistance in case of an
alleged breach of the rules, must have been based at least in part on
the conviction that the rules were good.2'
I suggested above that the miners passed their codes from behind a
veil of ignorance about their future success or failure, and it is inter-
esting to consider those codes from a Rawlsian perspective. Rawls
says explicitly that his work compares different regimes in their ideal
forms, and that it is irrelevant for his purpose whether a well-ordered
democratic society exists now or has ever existed; at most, he seeks
to show that such a society is possible in the future. °' Conversely, the
miners were aiming at much less than a well-ordered democratic so-
ciety; their rules governed only certain property rights in temporary,
highly specialized communities. Thus, their society cannot be tested
comprehensively against Rawls's theories. I will only remark on
some ways in which mining camps that followed the one-claim rule
could be said to satisfy the two principles of justice underlying
Rawls's idealized conception of a property-owning democracy-
namely, equal basic liberties for all and fair equality of opportunity,
coupled with the difference principle (i.e., that social and economic
205. See supra note 4.
206. See Zerbe & Anderson, supra note 9, at 114.
207. See RAwLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 12, at 16-17, 137.
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inequalities must "be to the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged
members of society"2"). I will suggest that they owe this resemblance
to the circumstances in which they were passed.
Rawls suggests that a well-ordered democratic society would take
the form of a property-owning democracy or a liberal-socialist
regime, and that either system in its ideal form could satisfy the two
principles of justice. For our purposes, we can leave aside the liberal-
socialist alternative. A property-owning democracy is a political
system in which private individuals own the means of production,
but property ownership is widespread. A free market is an essential
part of such a system because it sustains certain basic political and
personal liberties, such as the choice of an occupation.' Unchecked,
however, a free market generates concentrations of wealth. A pro-
perty-owning democracy "avoids this, not by the redistribution of
income to those with less at the end of each period, so to speak, but
rather by ensuring the widespread ownership of productive assets
and human capital (that is, education and trained skills) at the
beginning of each period.""21 This suggests that there would be limits
on intergenerational wealth transmission.2 In such a system, great
inequalities would not emerge in the first place. Richard Krouse and
Michael McPherson write that "clearly Rawls's view presupposes
that widespread ownership of productive property would result, and
if it did, the distinction between laboring and capitalist class would
disappear."" 2
In many ways, the mining camps that permitted miners to hold
only one claim at a time fit this picture. By preventing those who did
strike it rich from investing in multiple claims, the codes allowed
each miner to keep the rewards of his own labor, but not to use his
earnings to monopolize the means of production. In a way, the life of
a mining claim was the period at the end of which productive assets
would be reassigned in equal measure to all participants. Although
there were great inequalities in wealth, there was no concentration of
the ownership of the means of production. The miners developed
this arrangement to ensure that there would be no distinction be-
tween labor and capital. In this respect, the miners, from behind
208. Id. at 42-43.
209. Rawls suggests that in the just state, economic power must be dispersed among firms
and that it is desirable for citizens to share in exercising that power. See id. at 114, 138-39. See
also Richard Krouse & Michael McPherson, Capitalism, 'Property-Owning Democracy,' and
the Welfare State, in DEMOCRACY AND THE WELFARE STATE, 79, 81 (Amy Gutman ed.,
1988). Rawls expresses his debt to this article in JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 12, at 135.
210. RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 12, at 139.
211. See Krouse & McPherson, supra note 209, at 83, 100-04.
212. Id. at 83.
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their veil of ignorance, designed a regime that realized Rawls's prin-
ciples of justice.
In other respects, of course, the mines were a travesty of property-
owning democracy. The miners who enacted the codes were all
anglophone, American young men, and one way they sought to
maintain the political equality in the diggings was by ejecting those
whose rights were most vulnerable, namely, those of other ethnici-
ties.213 Moreover, the miners made no provision for those who
became too sick to work, and many miners died for lack of nursing.
In a just society, life-saving medical care would be available to all as
a fundamental element of fair equality of opportunity.14
Most strikingly, perhaps, mining itself stretched equality of oppor-
tunity to the point of absurdity. Since fair equality of opportunity is
one of Rawls's two principles of justice, he is deeply concerned about
the extent to which differences in natural endowments should be
allowed to result in inequalities of wealth."' In the mines, natural en-
dowments such as skill, strength, and perseverance conferred hardly
any advantage; almost every miner who kept a journal wrote that
mining was a lottery and success almost entirely a matter of luck."6
This was deeply demoralizing to the tens of thousands of young
Americans brought up to believe that hard work would be rewarded.
Rawls developed his famous difference principle-the view that
social and economic inequalities are to be to the greatest benefit of
the least advantaged members of society-as a means of respecting
the individual's "ownership" of his endowments (that is, of himself)
without allowing him to exploit them at the expense of the less for-
tunate.1 7 A world in which natural endowments counted for nothing
would be too equal for Rawls. Rawls's property-owning democracy
would-and the property regime in the gold mines did-promote
equality of opportunity by minimizing the impact of randomly
distributed advantages such as social class and talent. In the gold
mines, however, success and failure themselves were randomly distri-
buted; equal opportunity meant a ticket in a lottery that would gen-
erate highly unequal results. As Barbara Goodwin notes, the random
or arbitrary distribution of goods represents a kind of equality, but it
cannot be called egalitarian."' It is true that the miners played the
213. See, e.g., supra notes 71, 105; see also infra note 240.
214. See RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 12, at 174.
215. See id. at 74-77; Krouse & McPherson, supra note 209, at 94-99.
216. See infra note 222.
217. See RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 12, at 43, 74-77.
218. BARBARA GOODWIN, JUSTICE BY LOTTERY 116 (1992) (stating that a random
distribution of social goods in a once-and-for-all draw would not do a better job of promoting
equality than would any other means of distribution, but that repeated draws in a social lottery
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lottery repeatedly by working out one claim after another, and some-
one who knew nothing of the realities of gold mining might suppose
that this would mitigate the arbitrariness of the system. The chances
of succeeding in the diggings were so minute, however, that only one
in twenty immigrants made a profit on their venture, a result that is
equivalent to a single draw in a lottery.
B. Self-Interest
The norm of egalitarianism within the mining community, as I
have described it above, was driven by a kind of long-term self-
interest-a concern that if the privileged were to accumulate claims,
the majority of the community would eventually be reduced to
dependence and poverty. But the miners' decision to limit property
rights served their own immediate self-interest as well. The miners
themselves never articulated this point, but it can be deduced from
their aspirations and from the technical details of mining, the most
important of which, for present purposes, was the high turnover of
mining claims. What the miners did not do was to make an initial dis-
tribution of claims, and then to work those claims until the end of the
season. Instead, a miner and his companions would work their claims
until they were persuaded either that there was no gold there or that
they had taken out most of what there was. This process could take
as little as a few days, and seldom took more than three weeks. The
miners would then move on to another claim nearby, or even to
other diggings.219 The claims they had abandoned were very often
still desirable to others, however, who believed they might have
better luck than the original claimholders.22 ° These others might be
newcomers to the diggings looking for a foothold, or neighbors who
thought the abandoned claims looked better than the ones they were
currently working. With everyone moving all of the time, all had an
interest in seeing that mining claims became free as quickly as pos-
sible, and in bright-line rules defining when a claim became "jump-
able." The community did not want a few rich miners to buy up
claims and lock the others out.
would promote egalitarian social justice). I owe this reference to Simon Stern.
219. See Letter from Riley Senter to His Cousin (July 7, 1850, Angel's Camp, Calaveras
County), in RILEY SENTER, CROSSING THE CONTINENT TO CALIFORNIA GOLD FIELDS:
LETTERS OF RILEY SENTER WRITrEN DURING HIS TRIP ACROSS THE PLAINS FROM NEW
YORK IN 1849 AND DURING HIS FIRST YEARS IN THE GOLD CAMPS OF CALIFORNIA (1938)
(unpag.) (stating that miners might give up on a claim after three days and abandon it).
220. See, e.g., 1 TAYLOR, supra note 46, at 91 (ch. 9, "Diggings on Mokelumne River")
(describing Mokelumne Diggings in 1849, and stating that "[i]n the dry diggings especially,
where the metal frequently lies deep, many instances are told of men who have dug two or
three days and given up in despair, while others, coming after them and working in the same
hole, have taken out thousands of dollars in a short time"). .
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The uncertainty of mining-what made it a gamble-was the im-
possibility of knowing, even approximately, the value of any given
claim in advance. One of the flaws of both Umbeck's analysis and
that of Zerbe and Anderson involves their assumption that miners
would have had some knowledge about the value of a claim, at least
at its margins. The gold was distributed almost randomly, and there
were no indications on the surface of whether there was gold
underneath.22' This was especially true in the most crowded camps,
where the entire surface of the earth had been torn up and moved
from one pile to another, until there were no natural features left.
All of the soil contained some gold, but not all of it repaid washing.
The miners were looking for rich soil, leads within the soil, and gold
collected in the cracks and crannies of the bedrock. Such concentra-
tions of gold were very localized; there might be hundreds of dollars
worth of gold in one fissure in the bedrock, and no gold to speak of
within a radius of a hundred feet. Thus, a hundred parties could be at
work on a bar, all digging from dawn to dusk, and one might hit
upon a fortune in gold while the others barely made their keep.
Hence the clich, repeated in almost every journal and correspond-
ence, that mining was a lottery. 2 "No rules can be given, no evi-
dences furnished for finding the concealed veins or opening the rich
deposits," one miner wrote.223 Even one claim might yield very dif-
ferent amounts from one day to the next, so that future earnings
could not be predicted from the history of the claim. In May 1850, a
gold-seeker in Jacksonville reported that "[c]ases are very frequent
of persons making $100 in a day, and sometimes in a single hour, and
221. Taylor, for example, makes this point:
In holes dug side by side, I noticed that the clay would be reached eighteen inches below
the surface in one, and perhaps eight feet in the other. This makes the digging something
of a lottery, those who find a deposit always finding a rich one, and those who find none
making nothing at all.
Id. at 246 (ch. 23, "Journey to the Volcano"). Many claims were bought and sold never-
theless, but the risk factor was high. Prices were generally low, and where claims were be-
lieved to be especially valuable, the price was sometimes specified to be taken from future
earnings or to be a share of future earnings.
222. It would be easier to list here the handful of accounts that do not call mining a lottery
than to present a representative sample of the great majority that do. For a few examples of
this comparison, see Woods, supra note 77, at 56 ("[T]he chances of our making a fortune in
the gold mines are about the same as those in favor of our drawing a prize in a lottery."); Let-
ter from Charles Henri Doriot to his brother (Nov. 20, 1850, Coloma) (unpublished manu-
script, Bancroft Library, catalogued at Bane MSS 85/70 C) (stating that mining is like drawing
tickets in a lottery, and that "it is a new lesson to old miners that has bin mineing in other
places"); Letter from Kimball Hale Dimmick to "Sarah" (May 1, 1849, San Jose) (unpublished
manuscript, Bancroft Library, catalogued at Bane MSS C-B 847) (asking the recipient to tell
friends who think of coming to California "that they are entering into a lottery speculation
where the majority are doomed to lose").
223. Woods, supra note 77, at 20.
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the whole week following making nothing. ' 22' The guideline was that
the claims nearest to a big strike were also likely to be rich. The
claims next to a new discovery were therefore the most desirable,
although they often disappointed. 5
It is true that claims were bought and sold-that is, that a value
was assigned to them. In fact, it was impossible to get a claim in some
diggings except by buying. But the purchase of a claim was as much
of a gamble as any other aspect of mining. One man was said to have
offered to sell a claim on Poor Man's Creek for $50. The next day he
took $250 out of the claim, and the day after that, $2,000.226
Even if a miner was lucky enough to have a rich claim, it would
provide employment for only two to three weeks, and then he would
have to move on. 27 Moreover, the miners were restless, even when
their claims were paying well. At the slightest rumor of rich new
diggings, they were inclined to pack their things, turn their backs on
their claims, and rush off to the latest El Dorado. "There are thou-
sands of places where men can make from 5 to 8$ per day, but these
are little sought," a miner wrote. "Those who came by the last year's
emigration rush to the best points in the hope to make their fortunes
in the time allowed for their stay, say by this fall but this course is not
always practicable. 2
28
The claim that one miner abandoned, for whatever reason, might
be snapped up by someone else. The first wave of miners had gath-
ered the gold that lay near the surface, either highly concentrated in
the top layer of dirt, or on bedrock covered by only a few feet of soil.
In 1849, and increasingly thereafter, the gold-seekers had to dig deep
holes to find pay-dirt. Prospecting now involved digging down six
feet, ten feet, or even twelve feet, usually only to find that there was
not enough gold there to make digging remunerative. Mining re-
224. Id. at 131 (May 1, 1850, Jacksonville). See also Letter from Solomon A. Gorgas (Sept.
9, 1850, Placerville) (unpublished manuscript, Huntington Library, catalogued at HM 2187)
(describing two men who took $2,000 from a claim while those around him were barely making
board); "E.E.P.," From the Aines, PLACER TIMES (Sacramento), May 20, 1850, at 2 (stating
that a few people are making $500 to $1,000 per day, but that rich spots are scarce and soon
worked out, and they are randomly distributed through the diggings).
225. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas J. Van Dom to His Wife (July 28, 1850, Forks Yuba), in
Van Dom Papers, supra note 126 ("But like all other rich points the diggins are very unequal +
many claims fail").
226. See Parker, supra note 148 (entry for May 5, 1851, Poor Man's Creek, Plumas
County).
227. See, e.g., Hovey, Journal, supra note 71, at 55 (entries for Aug. 27-Sept. 8, 1849,
Mokelumne Hill, Calaveras County) (claim on virgin ground worked out in thirteen days); id.
at 100-01 (entries for Apr. 5-24, 1850, Jackson's Creek, Amador County) (claim worked out in
nineteen days); id. at 102 (entry May 4, 1850, Indian Gulch, Amador County) (claim worked
out in nine days).
228. Letter from Van Dorn, supra note 126.
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quired a greater investment of time and labor: one could say that the
price of the lottery ticket increased. At some point, a prospector
would conclude that it was not worth digging any deeper, that the
dirt he had taken out so far was not promising, and he would aban-
don his hole to try somewhere else. This was a judgment call, and the
miner sometimes gave up too soon; there might be gold only inches
below the level at which he stopped. It happened often enough that
two or three miners would dig for days and give up, and a newcomer
would jump into the same hole and hit a lead with the first shovelful.
An abandoned claim was therefore well worth trying again and
again."
In any case, as gold became scarcer and technology improved, the
same land was dug over repeatedly by successive claimants.' 0 If the
diggings were rich enough, the miners who left were able to sell their
claims and no ground was abandoned. In this case, the claim began
to look more like traditional property, in which the holder's rights
are derived from the first owner and not from his own occupation."3
In short, the miners were continuously on the move, continuously
seeking new claims. Newcomers to the diggings, obviously, were
better off under a system that made claims available as soon as
possible, and at the lowest possible price-and the newcomers were
among the voters. But the concerns of the present claimholders were
similar to those of newcomers, because they knew that in two weeks'
time, they would probably be unemployed and would need a new
location, and they could not know whether they would then have
money or not. Unless they had heard of other, richer diggings
elsewhere, miners preferred to stay in the vicinity of their old claims,
because of the costs involved in prospecting and moving camp.
Claimholders as well as outsiders therefore had a real interest in
229. See SHINN, supra note 15, at 24.
230. One miner, for example, wrote,
The first digging of the river banks + beds of the creeks, or rather the picking, gave from
four to six ounces per day + board worth $5.00, whiskey for $2 the glass or $5. per bottle;
the second digging and washing, which was more thorough and which I arrived in time to
get a parting glance at, gave from one to 2 1/2 ounces per day, board $3, whiskey 50c the
glass + two dollars per bottle; while the present working, with large machines called long
toms, gives from four to five dollars per day to the man, board $1, whiskey 12 1/2 cts the
glass + everything else in proportion. We now wash the dirt that has been washed
through cradles + break up and wash the ledge to the depth of two or three feet. I think it
will all be worked over again at one or two dollars per day.
Letter from A.W. Genung to "Friend Thomas," Apr. 22, 1851, Curtis Creek, Tuolumne Coun-
ty (unpublished manuscript, Beinecke Library, catalogued at WA MSS S-1277).
231. See, e.g., Letter from Van Dorn, supra note 126 ("Things have changed much since
we first came in. Then we had little difficulty in securing ground but now every point which has
any note is crowded + held of the first occupants.").
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keeping property mobile, and in making it impossible for a few
speculators to control the diggings.
I suggest that the miners voted for a system that would allow them
to keep playing the game; they opted for restricted property rights
now in exchange for the possibility of securing a new claim when
their own had been exhausted. The few miners who were not operat-
ing in the dark were those who already had money to invest in
claims. These miners opposed the one-claim rule and circumvented it
however they could.
The rigid restrictions on property also promoted administrative
efficiency, although the miners may not have had this in mind when
they set up their property regimes. They passed rules, elected
officials, and, in some camps, heard civil disputes and tried criminal
cases at mass meetings of up to several hundred men. Henry Hans-
mann, who has studied worker-owned firms, has found that the
biggest difficulty such firms face is the cost inherent in collective
decision-making. 32 Direct democracy is most viable, he found, where
workers are fairly homogeneous, that is, where they do similar work,
where there is minimal hierarchy of status or authority, and where
profits are equally divided-in other words, "where there is minimal
opportunity for conflicts of interest." '233 Hansmann notes that, in fact,
many worker-owned firms reinforce the homogeneity of interests of
their members by paying them all the same salary regardless of task,
productivity, or seniority. Plywood cooperatives say explicitly that
the policy of equal pay promotes harmony among the worker-
owners." The practice in law firms of dividing earnings equally
among all partners of the same age is particularly striking, Hans-
mann observes, because lawyers keep track of their billable hours
and it is relatively easy to calculate their productivity. The firms
could pay a partner according to his or her contribution, but they
choose not to. Many law firms have also refused to create part-time
partnerships, with a proportionate share of earnings, for women
partners who would like to combine practice with child-rearing.
Hansmann suggests that different categories of partners would
hamper the collective governance of the firm: "A simple rule under
which everyone does essentially the same amount and kind of work,
and receives the same pay, is by far the easiest to agree upon and to
enforce." '235 As service industries become ever larger and more com-
plex, Hansmann adds, they take on salaried employees or convert to
232. See Hansmann, supra note 14, at 1783-90.
233. Id. at 1784.
234. Id. at 1785.
235. Id. at 1787.
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investor ownership rather than continue as worker-owned, demo-
cratic companies. This was also the experience of the miners. In later
years, when labor became much cheaper, the Americans became
owners and specialist workers, while the manual labor was delegated
to foreigners, particularly Chinese immigrants.236
The miners never mention administrative efficiency as a reason for
restricting property rights. They may or may not have been aware
that their limits on property holding made it much easier for the
property regime to run itself, without a separate institution for law
enforcement. In fact, however, it was much easier for miners to
monitor one another's behavior if all claims were of equal size.
Where the first-comers were allowed to keep their large, original
claims, for instance, instead of accepting a new, standard-sized share,
what would happen when these were abandoned or sold? Would the
purchaser get the larger claim? How would first-comers document
their status or the extent of their original claims? In those camps
where accumulation of claims was permitted, there was always the
danger that "sales" were not what they seemed-that a group would
take claims by location, "sell" them to one another, and then locate
further claims for themselves. 7 In short, enforcement of the rules
depended on everyone's interests being open and obvious, which in
essence meant that these interests were equal. If a miner occupied a
claim of more than the standard size, others knew that the excess was
there for the taking; if a miner was absent for more than three days,
everyone knew that his claim could be jumped. In camps where the
rules permitted miners to accumulate claims or permitted groups of
miners to hold all of their several mining claims by working any one
of them, it became almost impossible for neighbors to monitor one
another.38 In short, the California diggings serve as yet another illus-
tration of Henry Hansmann's point that direct democracy is most
practicable when the members of the group have equal interests.
VI. CONCLUSION
Some of the most influential theories of property law begin with a
story about how private property first came into being, or a
cautionary tale about what would happen without private property.
236. See PAUL, supra note 1, at 323.
237. See Morriss, supra note 21, at 601 nn.85-86. Note the similar method of cheating on
load claims at a later date. See BROWNE, supra note 6, at 230 (stating that the customary limit
on quartz- mining claim size was "more apparent than real" and describing such fictitious
sales).
238. The difficulty of monitoring different kinds of interests is illustrated by claims held by
partnerships. See supra notes 140-143 and accompanying text.
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Carol Rose has argued persuasively that these stories are entirely
ahistorical and serve as modern fables rather than as attempts to
describe actual events.39 Rose's theory accounts for some of the odd
features of these creation myths; not only do they lack a setting in
place or time, but the actors are recognizably modern (post-medi-
eval), in a position to organize their affairs and negotiate with others,
and familiar with the option of private property. They are, in fact,
the philosopher's contemporaries transported to a wilderness and
free to design society anew. Locke suggests as much when he says,
"In the beginning, all the world was America." We know, however,
as Locke presumably did, that the English colonists in America did
not reinvent private property, and this was indeed one of the
institutions that the founding fathers explicitly sought to preserve a
century later.
Rose suggests that Locke and Blackstone never pretended to be
writing history books. Their stories were noble lies, intended to
persuade the reader that limited cooperation was better for him than
all-out competition-that by surrendering the power to grab, the
individual ultimately gets more, and is able to keep more. If Rose is
right, as I believe she is, then Locke and the other theorists did not
care about how property law evolved, or about comparative property
law, or even whether every single person (as opposed to everyone
collectively) is better off under a regime recognizing private pro-
perty. Since the accuracy of their stories was irrelevant, the develop-
ments in the wilderness of the Sierra Nevada would not have
mattered to them one way or the other.
It would not have mattered except in this: assuming Rose is right,
these accounts of the origins of private property are hurried and
vague because Locke and Blackstone were not sure that rational
self-interest would necessarily generate a private property regime.
They were so little impressed by human nature that they did not
even consider more idealistic or egalitarian systems; it was enough
for them to persuade - or beguile - the stronger and more aggressive
members of society to recognize private property. But the real-world
experiences of the California gold miners was that the most self-
interested modern men, whose single goal was to get rich quick,
made a social compact almost automatically; and this compact was in
some ways, and especially in some camps, more egalitarian than that
imagined by the classical theorists. This is not to say that the miners
were saints. Their respect for majority rule may count as a virtue,
their support for labor over capitalism was at best enlightened self-
239. See Carol Rose, Property as Storytelling: Perspectives from Game Theory, Narrative
Theory, Feminist Theoty, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 37, 48-52 (1990).
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interest; at worst, it showed a selfish disregard for the long-term well-
being of the state. Moreover, a large number of camps did allow
accumulation of claims, and thus rejected the strict egalitarianism of
the one-claim rule.
The mining codes show that many Americans designing new
property regimes in the diggings were anti-capitalist and opposed
fee-simple in mineral lands. Their egalitarian, use-based system
worked well, however, only when the relationship between a claim-
holder and his claim was simple, open, and obvious, a state of affairs
that could not be maintained for long even with the best will in the
world. This ideal regime was undermined early on by adjustments to
the practical requirements of mining and by the inventiveness of
greedy individuals-and eventually also by the exhaustion of the
mines and the introduction of capital-intensive mining technology.
Thus the miners' experience demonstrates that some Americans in
certain conditions rejected fee-simple, but that experience does not
provide evidence that a use-based property regime could be
sustained.
The differences between the various codes illustrate the indeter-
minacy of basic ideological commitments-that is, values such as
fairness, equal opportunity, and equality generate varied property
regimes even in the same environment and with similar, sometimes
identical players. Although equality dictated a maximum size for
claims held by preemption in any given camp, it could not determine
what that size should be; claim sizes in the richest camps varied from
ten feet square to thirty feet square. More strikingly, "fairness," in
American mines, had both Rawlsian and Lockean elements to it,
which could not both be satisfied at once. In some camps, fairness
and equality meant equal opportunity; one claim of the standard size
for each or one lottery ticket. Some might strike it rich while others
had nothing to show for their labor, and this was almost entirely a
matter of chance, but individuals who were lucky in the first round
could not use their winnings to improve their chances by buying
multiple claims. Here the Rawlsian idea of fairness predominated. In
other camps, fairness and equality meant that a willing seller and
willing buyer could enter into any transaction they wished. Here,
claims were bought and sold just like real property back in the states,
resulting in a more Lockean regime.
Nowhere were a strong arm, hard work, and self-denial sure to be
rewarded, nor were gambling and drinking sure to lead to ruin, since
even for those accustomed to hard labor, success depended largely
on luck rather than effort. One might see this as a logical extension
of the principle that the endowments of society and nature should
give no one an advantage, but it makes an absurdity of Locke's idea
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that the basis of private property is the individual's natural rights in
the product of his own labor.24 The miners were disturbed by this
paradox. They knew that mining was a lottery and that success was a
matter of luck, yet they continued to believe that industry and
frugality would be rewarded. Failure in the mines was thus inevitably
regarded as a personal failure, and the miners never doubted that it
was fair for each to keep the gold he had found.4 In short, the mines
promoted neither a Rawlsian nor a Lockean notion of fairness, both
of which demand that one own the products of one's labor.
APPENDIX: THE SOURCES
There were some 500 mining districts in California before 1860 and
all of these enacted mining codes, some 175 of which are preserved.2
These provide the bulk of the data on which Charles Umbeck based
his work on property rights in the California gold mines. For the
purposes of this article-namely, to investigate the development of
property regimes in 1849 and 1850-the published law codes are not
very useful. For one thing, they are too laconic. They provide the
barebones of a property regime, including the name and boundaries
of the district, the maximum size of claim, the requirements for
making and/or registering a claim, work requirements, the number of
claims one could hold, and some provisions for dispute resolution;
but they almost never include information about why or how they
were enacted, apart from an occasional platitude in the preamble
about the importance of law and order. In the few cases where we
know the real reason that a code was passed, it has nothing to do
with the pious generalizations offered in the text. We know almost
nothing about the context of any particular published code: the
richness of the diggings, the number of miners, the conflicting
interests, who and how many attended the miners' meeting at which
240. Americans sometimes argued that Chileans should be excluded from the mines
because they were better miners and thus had an (unfair) advantage. See, e.g., The Placer,
PLACER TIMES (Sacramento), May 26, 1849, at 2 (reporting hostility to Chileans, who are
"expert washers" and are "well fitted... for labor on the slopes of Sierra Nevada" because of
"a life of servitude, together with exposure to a hot climate"). See also "J.M.E.," supra note 74,
at 1 (lamenting that the Chileans brought with them cheap hired labor and that "they are
better qualified and equipped for mining operations than we are generally"). The Americans
used any and every argument that came to hand against foreigners, however, whether or not
they were consistent or logical.
241. Although many miners compared mining to a lottery, see supra note 222, none went
so far as to call it gambling, perhaps because miners did heavy manual labor and injured no
one but themselves. On gambling as evil, analogous to speculation, see KAREN HALTrUNEN,
CONFIDENCE MEN AND PAINTED WOMEN: A STUDY OF MIDDLE-CLASS CULTURE IN
AMERICA 1830-1870, at 16-17 (1982).
242. The majority of these are printed in KING, supra note 50. For further publications, see
UMBECK, supra note 9, at 104-05, tbl.8.1.
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it was passed, what rules had been in force before, and so on. Most
importantly, there are no codes preserved from 1849 and only two or
three from 1850; almost all of the codes were drafted long after a
customary law of mining had developed. To study the development
of property law, therefore, one must turn to more discursive
accounts of life in the mines in the first years of the gold rush.
Thousands of California letters and journals were saved by their
owners and are now in library collections or in printed editions.243
This Article is based almost entirely on these primary accounts,
which described events and impressions as they occurred, in raw and
unpolished language. Accounts of legal matters are few and far
between; no forty-niner bothered to give a systematic description of
property law in the diggings. It is maddening that miners who, for
months at a time, experienced nothing of interest other than fluctua-
tions in the price of flour, could mention a miners' meeting without
going into any detail, but this happens time and again.
These are the problems of original sources of every period;
however, the miners' letters and journals also have their own diffi-
culties. First, only those miners who had a home wrote letters home.
All of the writers had strong family ties and almost all intended to
return to their parents or wives. Internal evidence suggests that many
of the journals, too, were intended to be read, probably by the folks
back home. The recorded impressions of the gold mines are there-
fore those of family-oriented, relatively responsible individuals, who
congregated with others of their own sort. The writers were liter-
ate-self-evidently-and they expected their letters to reach their
friends and relatives. It is quite possible that the soldiers, sailors,
trappers and other loners in the mines would have told very different
stories. This may account for my impression that frontiersmen (from
Missouri, Arkansas, and Oregon) are under-represented in the
literature, although they were conspicuous among the miners for
their long-guns, their sharp-shooting, and their lack of education.
Second, since diaries and letters were written to be read, we must
assume they were self-censored. It was common for letter writers to
report greater success than they actually enjoyed, or at any rate to
write home only when they were successful; similarly, they describe
the drinking and gambling in the camps but never refer to their own
lapses of this sort (although one journalist records in code that he
243. Works published by persons who participated in or witnessed the gold rush are col-
lected in GARY F. KURUTz, THE CALIFORNIA GOLD RUSH: A DESCRIPTIVE BIBLIOGRAPHY
OF BOOKS AND PAMPHLETS COVERING THE YEARS 1848-1853 (1997). This bibliography is
comprehensive and includes essential information about authors and their publications. Many
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had broken his resolution not to drink).2'" It is quite possible, there-
fore, that our sources represent not only the views of just one section
of the mining community, but also that those views were carefully
edited.
Finally, the quantity of primary sources from 1848 to 1850 is over-
whelming, and references to legal matters are sporadic and unpre-
dictable. I have read hundreds of published and unpublished letters,
journals, and newspapers, which represent a random and, I hope,
representative sample of the larger corpus.
Contemporary newspapers are surprisingly unhelpful. The Califor-
nian, later the Alta California, was published in San Francisco
throughout the gold rush, and the Sacramento Placer Times began
publication early in 1849, but both reported developments in the
mines haphazardly, as miners sent in reports from the various dig-
gings. These papers do not provide any details about legal develop-
ments in the mines, except to mention that a meeting had been held
or that the miners of a certain camp had expelled foreigners. From
1850 on, the newspapers provide many brief reports of murders in
the mines, and sometimes also of lynch trials. Again, however, these
are sketchy and probably also haphazard.
As noted above, this discussion is based on only "present sense
impressions," and not on memoirs or recollections recorded long
after the event. The gold rush was already becoming the stuff of
legends in 1849, and the miners worked and reworked their stories to
fit their chaotic and unglamorous experiences into the dominant
paradigm of the gold rush as the triumph of American ingenuity and
self-government. For instance, the entry in Joseph Warren Wood's
journal for January 20, 1850, includes included a wry description of
an early meeting:
The People had curious Ideas & curious understandings or
rather misunderstandings. I left the assembly while they were
adopting a criminal code & an Englishman was telling how
many of the States of the World he had been in. He ought to
have been knocked down, & a clause passed justifying it.215
Wood idealizes the meeting as a model of simple democracy, but
pokes fun at the ineptitude of the miners and is especially amused by
an Englishman who thought himself qualified to speak about
criminal law because he had traveled a great deal. By June 25, 1852,
however, Wood's description of miners' meetings is tidied up and
244. See Mobley, supra note 163, at 84 (entry for Aug. 16, 1850) (writing, in code, "Took
one glass or two of wine this evening").
245. Wood, supra note 79 (entry for Jan. 20, 1850, Jacksonville).
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almost reverential. The meetings were organized and effective, he
says, and the miners enacted laws that were both wise and practi-
cal.246 By that time, the first years of the gold rush had already
become a golden age, and Wood recalls his own experiences in this
flattering light. In general, the miners of 1848 were heroes to those of
1849; and 1849 was legendary to the miners of 1850. Former miners
who published their recollections of the gold rush some thirty to
forty years after the event were often demonstrably confused about
what had happened, and when. Those who were present at the
discovery of gold on January 24, 1848, told quite different stories in
later years about what happened on that memorable day.247 Second-
ary works, such as histories of the various mining districts written in
the 1880s, seldom describe their own sources of information and are
at least as unreliable as memoirs.24 s I hesitate to rely on even Charles
Howard Shinn's ground-breaking works on law in the mines, both of
which were written at Johns Hopkins and were obviously carefully
researched, because they contain no footnotes and are based largely
on interviews with former miners, which were no more reliable than
the memoirs written at the time.249
246. See id. (entry for June 25, 1852, Jacksonville).
247. See THE CALIFORNIA GOLD DISCOVERY: SOURCES, DOCUMENTS, ACCOUNTS, AND
MEMOIRS RELATING TO THE DISCOVERY OF GOLD AT SUrrER'S MILL (Rodman W. Paul ed.,
1966).
248. Compare, for instance, Edwin Bean's account of the early history of the Rough &
Ready diggings with that of Harry L. Wells. Wells, writing thirteen years after the publication
of Bean's work, presents a much more circumstantial report. It is hard to tell whether Wells
had better sources than Bean, or whether he embroidered on his predecessor's story. See supra
note 153.
249. See SHINN, supra notes 6 and 15. On Shinn's sources and methods, see Rodman
Wilson Paul, Introduction to SHINN, supra note 6, at ix-xxiii.
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